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FEDERALISM: NECESSARY LEGAL 
FOUNDATION FOR THE CENTRAL 





The Central Middle East—comprising of Syria, Israel, Palestine, 
Lebanon, and Jordan—is in need of a legal foundation defined by 
a constitutional umbrella that governs it as a whole.  This is a 
proposed broad structure of such legal foundation that serves 
regional legal and economic needs and includes recognition of 
human rights.  
  
The need for such restructuring is evident from the persistence of 
regional conflict and instability. Conflict and instability have been 
constants in the region in general and certainly in the listed five 
states. The issues include political instability, terrorism, 
continuous threats of fundamentalism, and pervasive disregard to 
human life and human rights.  Israel has had strife with all the 
four neighboring peoples and states. Meanwhile, political 
instability either reigns or undermines each of these neighboring 
states. This article does not attempt to argue the correctness or 
fairness of what manifested in the first half of the 20th century; it 
does, however, argue that the political structure and how it 
continues to be is part of the reason for the conflicts and the 
instability.   
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This Article presents federalism for the five states as the necessary 
political structure and legal foundation, as the one option that 
allows the five states to co-exist, to recognize human rights as we 
define them today, and to allow for economic and cultural growth. 
This Article also argues that such a structure must begin from 
within, with the support of the great and global powers including 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Middle East has witnessed numerous conflicts over the 
centuries.  The region continues to witness conflicts; however 
today these conflicts are arguably more pronounced and have a 
larger effect on the global community.  The conflicts may be 
considered the results of internal conflicting interests where 
religious factions battle for control over land and governments.  
The conflicts also result from regional and global conflicting 
interests where surrounding nations and global powers struggle to 
create ties with Middle Eastern governments and to maintain some 
control over the region’s resources. 
Internally, the region has witnessed infighting between a 
multitude of ethnic and religious factions.  General and broad 
examples of this include, but not limited to, struggles between 
Shiite Muslims and Sunni Muslims, Arab-speaking peoples and 
Kurdish populations, and Jews and Muslims.1  Regionally, 
struggles between states have mirrored similar ethnic and religious 
differences, such that various governments have continuously 
attempted to influence other governments and undermine opposing 
factions, for instance, Iran and Syria representing a Shiite-type 
coalition versus Saudi Arabia and Qatar representing a Sunni-type 
coalition.2  The global community, including for example the 
United States, Russia, and the European Union, also has economic 
and political interests in the region, with the added consequence of 
being directly affected by the region’s instability through 
terrorism.  
For the purposes of this Article, Syria, Israel, Palestine, 
Lebanon, and Jordan comprise the Central Middle East.  These five 
states continue to witness a disproportionate share of the conflicts 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Andreas Gorzewski, Sunnis, Shiites locked in an endless 
conflict, DW (May 1, 2016), https://www.dw.com/en/sunnis-shiites-locked-in-
an-endless-conflict/a-18958491(explaining conflict between the Sunnis and 
Shiites). 
2 See Shlomo Brom & Yoel Guzansky, The conflict in Yemen: A case 
study of Iran’s limited power, Insight No. 747 INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. STUDIES 
(Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-conflict-in-yemen-a-
case-study-of-irans-limited-power/ (“All of this has led to the present situation 
in which there is a war-by-proxy between a Saudi Arabian-led Sunni coalition 
and an Iranian-led Shiite coalition.”). 
5
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in the general region.  A large focus of these conflicts revolves 
around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
Palestine’s, Syria, and Lebanese Hezbollah refuse to 
partially or fully recognize Israel’s right to exist, and, as a result, 
Israel has often argued that these parties continue to pose a deep 
security threat to Israel.3  On the other hand, each of Palestine’s, 
Syria, and Lebanese Hezbollah argue that Israel continues to 
violate various areas of international law such as systematic 
discrimination and accession of land by force.4  As for Jordan, it is 
estimated that half of its citizens are of Palestinian-roots, thus, 
creating an arguably precarious effect to Jordan’s current peaceful 
relationship with Israel.5  
This Article argues that these five states are central to the 
Middle East particularly from a political standpoint.  In other 
words, as the region and the global community struggle with 
various interests in the region, these five states attract a 
disproportionate amount of those interests, adding to the internally 
conflicting interests.  The Article further argues that, in large part, 
the political and legal structures of these states cannot handle such 
multi-level conflicting interests and allow such multi-level 
conflicting interests to destabilize the region.  As such, the goal of 
this Article is to demonstrate that the Central Middle East—
comprised of the five aforementioned states—is in need of a legal 
foundation defined by a constitutional umbrella that governs it as a 
whole.  The other goal is to propose a broad structure for such 
legal foundation that serves regional legal needs and includes 
declarations of human rights.   
                                                            
3 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33566, LEBANON: THE ISRAEL-
HAMAS-HEZBOLLAH CONFLICT 1 (2016), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20060915_RL33566_8b116c77b728bc405
4f9a71cbaaf24f5b7eabaa3.pdf (“Particularly along Israel's northern front, 
achieving peace between the major parties has been an elusive goal. The task 
has grown even more complex with the rising influence of non-state political 
movements/terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, on Lebanon's 
southern border. Neither organization recognizes Israel's right to exist as a 
nation-state.”). 
4 See, e.g., id. at 10. 
5 See, e.g., Murdar Zahran, Jordan Is Palestinian, 19 MIDDLE E. Q. 3, 3 
(2012). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/1
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 This Article does not attempt to argue the 
correctness/incorrectness or fairness/unfairness of what manifested 
in the first half of the 20th century.  It does, however, argue that the 
political structure is the reason for the conflicts and the instability, 
that the solution must begin from within, and that the five states 
must build on such a structure as a guide to hold each other 
accountable. 
This Article presents federalism as the solution—
federalism that links the five states through one foundational legal 
structure—a structure that enforces overarching principles such as 
tolerance and non-discrimination, while also allowing for member-
state autonomy.  The argument here is that federalism is the 
necessary political structure and legal foundation, establishing 
federalism as the one option that serves internal, regional, and 
global interests.  This is because it allows the five states to co-
exist, recognize human rights as we define them today, allow for 
economic and cultural growth, and promote accountability between 
the member states, while also promoting cooperation and trade 
with the global community.  Additionally, such a structure must 
begin from within, with the support of the great and global powers 
including the United States and Russia.  
 Part II describes and highlights the current state of affairs 
and effects of the current structure by presenting the general 
instabilities as symptoms and as inevitable results of the political 
structure, highlighting the need for effective restructuring.  Part III 
argues that the current political structure is the root of the issue 
because it attracts numerous conflicting interests leading to the 
conditions described in Part II.  Part IV presents federalism as the 
effective solution, joining the current Central Middle Eastern states 
under one legal structure to decouple the conflicting internal and 
external interests, and to position the region to address and handle 
these internal and external interests.  Part V argues that alternative 
structures, such as unions and treaties, have not succeeded in 
addressing because such approaches cannot address the conflicting 
interests.  Part VI discusses the necessary structure and how to 
bring it about Part VII attempts to present possible risks. 
7
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II. SYMPTOMS: POLITICAL INSTABILITY, TERRORISM, 
FUNDAMENTALISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
Instabilities within the Middle East, particularly the Central 
Middle East, include political instabilities, continuous and long-
lived threats of violence, fundamentalisms that reflect the views of 
small minorities, and violations of multiple areas of human rights 
laws. 
A. Political Instability 
Aside from Israel, governments of Central Middle Eastern 
states are under almost constant threat of overthrow.  While Israel 
has managed to maintain a relatively stable political structure, the 
other four states are generally and continuously threatened by 
differing factions.  Today, multiple conflicting sides struggle to 
impose control over not only resources but also ideologies.  Such 
struggles may be the result of inadequate governing on the part of 
the established governments remains, however, that the established 
governments play their part by employing systems of oppression as 
the approach to maintain control.  The result is a multi-faction 
struggle for self-rule, imposing structures of governance, control of 
resource distribution, and most prominently, definitions of origins 
and cultural identities and ideologies.6 
Additionally, other factors work as catalysts for instability.  
First, the concentration of the holy sites in the Middle East and the 
“monopolization of Arabic over Islamic jurisprudence,” give the 
Arab historic core great advantage and influence over the region 
and over non-Arabic speaking populations.7  Second, oil-rich gulf 
states maintain influential effects through “funding conservative 
movements and schools” that seek “counter-reformation against 
less austere local traditions”8 or non-agreeable governments.  
                                                            
6 See Laurie King-Irani, To Reconcile, or to be Reconciled?: Agency, 
Accountability, and Law in Middle Eastern Conflicts, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 369, 385 (2005) (explaining the structures of government in the 
central Middle East). 
7 P.W. SINGER, THE BROOKINGS PROJECT ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE 
ISLAMIC WORLD, THE 9-11 WAR PLUS 5: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING 
FORWARD AT U.S.-ISLAMIC WORLD RELATIONS 24 (2006). 
8 Id. at 4. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/1
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Moreover, sectarianism has taken hold.  Sectarianism to the 
extent it is today is not an ancient identity system, but actually 
appeared as a response to “internal and external changes in the 
mid-19th century Ottoman Empire.”9  It is arguably the result of 
multiple conflicting interests, including ideologies, control of land, 
and control of revered sites.  The many examples of the 
instabilities include the rebellion in Syria and other Arabic-
speaking countries, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Lebanon’s 
struggles to find a sustainable governing structure.   
 Thus, the current political structure has not succeeded in 
facing the multi-layered challenges.  In short, the Arab State 
system’s post-colonization continues to lack the “structural [and] 
institutional underpinnings” of envisioned nation-statehood.10  The 
Cold War supported the structure of these nominal states and 
veiled their weaknesses.11  Events of the past sixty or so years have 
shown that stability of the current “Middle Eastern states . . . can 
be maintained only through coercion and intensified surveillance 
of the populace through oppressive intelligence services,” 
primarily because of the nominal character of these states.12  In 
addition, high birth rates, resulting in demographic changes, add 
domestic pressure on Middle Eastern governments, such that the 
Middle Eastern ruling powers in totality have been becoming 
unable to legitimize their rule and less capable of containing forces 
counter to their rule.13  In addition, dysfunctional leaderships have 
prevailed and have been other “indices of impunity’s triumph.”14 
 In summary, political instability with recurring, inescapable 
cycles of conflicts between the various factions and against 
governing bodies, is one symptom of the need for restructuring.  It 
is arguable that the instabilities are the results of oppression and 
external interests and interference.  It is more productive to 
consider whether an effective legal foundation and structure would 
address the region’s oppressions and conflicting sides and whether 
                                                            
9 King-Irani, supra note 6, at 379. 
10 Bassam Tibi, The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Secular Order in 
the Middle East, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 191, 193 (1999). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 195. 
13 Id. at 198. 
14 King-Irani, supra note 6, at 384. 
9
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such foundation would allow a government to meet its 
populations’ needs as well as to handle external interests and in 
turn affect stability. 
B. Terrorism 
Another symptom of the need for a legal foundation and 
structure is terrorism.  The New Oxford American Dictionary 
Online defines terrorism as “[t]he unlawful use of violence and 
intimidation . . . in the pursuit of political aims,”15 implying that 
the desire for political change or political goals is the driving force.  
The United States Code defines terrorism, international and 
domestic, in part as activities that: 
 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life . . . [and]  
(B) appear to be intended  
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
or  
 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping.16 
. . .  
In 2006, when addressing the 9/11 attacks, Singer noted 
that for recurring and group terrorist attacks, an inspiring leader is 
necessary to build off of a base of existing “economic, political, 
social, and cultural crises.”17  
Singer argues that there are two divergent approaches to 
understanding terrorism.  First the root cause approach, which 
maintains that “poverty, ignorance, and lack of political expression 
provide [a] breeding ground for terrorist organization.”18  Second, 
the security threat approach, which maintains that the “focus on 
                                                            
15 Terrorism, OXFORD DICTIONARY, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/terrorism (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
16 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-8). 
17 SINGER, supra note 7, at 4. 
18 Id. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/1
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intelligence, protection, and coercive action” prevent terrorism, 
and that socioeconomic deprivation have no connection to 
terrorism, citing that Bin Laden and his group were neither poor 
nor uneducated.19  Singer adds that both approaches are right and 
wrong in that a leader who can inspire distinguishes one radical 
group from another, but the appeal becomes seductive when 
economic, political, social, and cultural crises combine.20 
Activities falling under the traditional definitions or code 
are amply reported in the news, whether in a Central Middle 
Eastern state,21 other regional states such as Turkey22 or Pakistan, 
Europe,23 or the United States.24  Moreover, an arguable 
commonality between many of these events is that the actors often 
justify the acts in the name of religion, and that the actors, as well 
as the acts, are connected to the Middle East in one way or another.  
The frequency and constancy of these terrorist acts make it clear 
                                                            
19 Id.; see Mohamed R. Hassanien, International Law Fights Terrorism 
in the Muslim World: A Middle Eastern Perspective, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 221, 222–23 (2008) (pointing to poverty, ignorance, and lack of political 
expression as one approach to understanding terrorism). 
20 SINGER, supra note 7, at 4. 
21 See Gili Cohen, Hebron Brothers in Custody for Sniper Attacks 
Against Israelis, HAARETZ (Feb. 29, 2016, 7:40 PM), 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.706186; see also Gili Cohen & 
Chaim Levinson, Israeli Policeman Stabbed in West Bank Village Near Jericho, 
HAARETZ (Mar. 3, 2016, 7:35 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/1.706704.  
22 See Murad Sezer & Osman Orsal, Two Female Militants Killed After 
Attacking Police Station Outside Istanbul, HAARETZ (Mar. 3, 2016, 12:40 PM), 
http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.706717; Declan Walsh, et al., 
Taliban Attack at Bacha Khan University in Pakistan Renews Fears, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/world/asia/bacha-
khan-university-attack-
charsadda.html?emc=edit_na_20160120&nlid=67698734&ref=cta&_r=0.  
23 Murad Makhmudov, et al., Islamists Slaughter at least 120 people in 
Paris: France on the Wrong Side of History in Libya and Syria, MODERN 
TOKYO NEWS (Nov. 14, 2015), 
https://moderntokyonews.com/2015/11/14/islamists-slaughter-at-least-120-
people-in-paris-france-on-the-wrong-side-of-history-in-libya-and-syria/. 
24 Michael S. Schmidt & Salman Masood, San Bernardino Couple 
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that we have allowed such acts to become too common a headline 
to continue without a vision that directly addresses the motivations.  
When considering the security perspective as described by 
Singer, it is arguable that a new approach to security is needed 
because violence in the Middle East, in the shape of terrorism, is 
carried out by irregular warriors who are fundamentalists or ethnic 
nationalists and are unlikely to be contained by institutionalized 
armies.25  However, regardless of whether it is economics and/or 
security that hold the key to addressing terrorism, it is interesting 
that while fundamentalists are succeeding in using Islam as the 
motivation and basis for their movements, the overarching 
principle in Islam concerning violence is embodied in the Quranic 
verse: The taking of one life is like the killing of all humankind.26  
In turn, for a society or a government to claim that Islam is the 
cause or motivation of terrorist acts against it would be avoiding 
the actual issue, regardless of whether those acts were in attempt to 
intimidate, coerce, or influence in the name of Islam.  
A broad perspective notes that Islamist movements have 
used confrontation as a tool to de-couple the region from the West, 
from Western interests, Western values, and Western influence.27  
In contrast, there is barely any evidence of other movements, such 
as the conflict in Northern Ireland, the Basque region, or Central 
and South America, having become conflicts with a global effect.  
One explanation perhaps is that the Muslim or the Arabic-speaking 
populations are much larger than populations involved in 
aforementioned conflicts.  While this is true, this point supports the 
argument for the multi-level conflicting interests—that the conflict 
in the Central Middle East draws internal and global conflicting 
interests that are leading to internal, regional, and global terrorism.  
Taken a step further, a more focused perspective points to the 
                                                            
25  Tibi, supra note 10, at 204. 
26 See Hassanien, supra note 19, at 230. See generally Greg Callaghan, 
‘Islamism is not Islam’: confronting Europe’s terrorism problem, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Dec. 8, 2018) (quoting Ed Husain, author of The Islamist: 
“mainstream Muslims are drowned out by Islamists . . . .” and “most Muslims 
know that Islamism is not Islam[.]”) 
https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/islamism-is-not-islam-confronting-
europe-s-terrorism-problem-20181204-p50k0f.html. 
27 Tibi, supra note 10, at 197.  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/1
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conflict between Israel and the Arab-speaking populations as a 
conflict that fuels the larger part of today's terrorism,28 or at the 
minimum contributes to the rise of ‘inspiring leadership.’ 
 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict effectively pins those of the 
Jewish faith against the Palestinians in particular, but also against 
the rest of the Middle Eastern populations.  Zionist leaders, 
through the Jewish National Fund, pursued and purchased land in 
what was Palestine29 and, eventually, relying on the Balfour 
Declaration to declare independence, fought the 1948 war and 
expelled the Palestinians.30  The Zionist movement and ideology 
was central to the establishment of Israel, not simply as a state, but 
as a Jewish state.31  Israel’s Declaration of Independence asserts 
that Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people, dismissing the 
presence of other peoples with a claim to lands in the area and 
referring to Palestinians as illegitimate inhabitants of the land.32 
Israel is a Jewish state is in its legal foundation, legislated in 1950, 
and repeated in practices as well as further legislation in 1992.33   
                                                            
28 See Hassanien, supra note 19, at 226, 231 (discussing the conflict 
and how it has been the driving force behind today’s terrorism); see also 
SINGER, supra note 7, at 4. 
29 See John Dever & James Dever, The Occupation of Truth, 33 MISS. 
C. L. REV. 39, 40 (2014). 
30 Authors debate the start of the war, with Jewish writers pointing to 
Palestinians rejecting the United Nations Resolution of partitioning the land into 
Israel and Palestine and taking up arms against the Jewish population and 
eventually losing land in Israel’s War of Independence. See, e.g., Shlomo Gazit, 
Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points, 555 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 82, 83 (1998). Other authors point to 
Israel starting the war after declaring independence and forcibly dispossessing 
Palestinians from their homeland. See, e.g., Dever & Dever, supra note 29, at 
40.  
31 See generally Rabbi Ed Snitkoff, Secular Zionism: From Religious 
Idea to Secular Ideology, MY JEWISH LEARNING 
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/secular-zionism/ (last visited Apr. 
16, 2019) (explaining Zionism as a whole). 
32 Pnina Lahav, A “Jewish State . . . to Be Known as the State of 
Israel”: Notes on Israeli Legal Historiography, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 387, 402 
(2001). 
33 See Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752, § 1(a) (as amended) (Isr.), 
translated in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, KNESSET, 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm (last visited Apr. 
10, 2019) [hereinafter Basic Law: Human Dignity] (Isr.) (stating that this law’s 
13
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Regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of Israel as a 
Jewish state, objectively the issue in its simplest is that such an 
approach is pinning the Jewish population against the Muslim 
population with regional players and global powers essentially 
taking sides.  The Muslim population in turn has a common cause 
against Israel as well as global powers supporting Israel.  While the 
vast majority of Muslims do not react with violence,34 the pretext 
remains the same in its simplest form—Jews and Muslims against 
each other, in turn pinning the whole of the Muslim population 
with a common cause.  This is not to say that the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is the one source and cause of terrorism, but rather, that the 
conflict and the resulting conflicting interests, are contributors. 
Middle Easterners, or those of Middle Eastern descent, 
involved in terrorist acts either internally or globally, come from 
various backgrounds. They may be, for example, of Palestinian 
origin, Syrian, Lebanese, Egyptian, Turkish, or Saudi Arabian, or 
from other Persian Gulf countries, northern African countries, or 
may even be Europeans with Middle Eastern backgrounds.  By the 
same token, and regarding the Islamic State (“IS”), it has become 
well-established that foreign fighters comprise a large portion of IS 
fighters.35   
It is granted that the reasons for Middle-Eastern-related 
terrorism are broader than simply the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
For example, the New York Times reported on the attack on 
Charlie Hebdo as a ten-year deepening radicalism fueled by 
American soldiers humiliating Muslims.36  Thus, the reasons for 
                                                            
purpose is, in part, to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as 
a Jewish and democratic state).  
34 See ANTHONY CORDESMAN, ISLAM AND THE PATTERNS IN 
TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES 
(CSIS) 1, 23–25, 46, 52 (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/islam-
and-patterns-terrorism-and-violent-extremism (Working Draft). 
35 See Anna Altman, Opinion, How Many Foreign Fighters Have 
Joined ISIS?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014, 9:29 AM), http://op-
talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/how-many-foreign-fighters-have-joined-
isis/. 
36 Rukmini Callimachi & Jim Yardley, From Amateur to Ruthless 
Jihadist in France, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/world/europe/paris-terrorism-brothers-
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/1
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Middle-Eastern-related terrorist activities must be considered from 
a broader perspective, one that considers the current political 
structure as well as the ramifications of the structure leading to 
multi-level conflicting interests.   
European countries, the United States, and Russia, have all 
maintained interests and influence in the region.  Most notably, the 
United States consistently has had a foreign policy that supports 
Israel as the best means to support its interests.37  In short, while 
neither the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nor Islam, can be the 
scapegoat for explaining today’s Middle Eastern-related terrorist 
acts, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does spill over to bordering 
countries, regional countries, as well as global powers, and attracts 
conflicting interests leading to terrorism in the name of a common 
cause and led by inspiring leaders—Muslims against Israel and the 
West. 
C. Fundamentalism 
The combination of human development gaps and broken 
regimes to a large extent explains the failing environment in which 
radicals thrive.38  Al-Qaeda’s popularity has been, in part, due to 
its ability to draw from the sense of frustration that poorly 
educated youth, those lacking the skills for employment and 
alienated from their local system and the global political systems, 
feel.39  
The current population in the Middle East as a whole is 
projected to almost double, with a growth rate of around 130%, 
because approximately half the Arab population, Iranians, and 
Pakistanis are younger than twenty years old; in comparison, 
slightly more than one-quarter of the populations in Western 
countries are younger than twenty-years old.40  With current 
                                                            
said-cherif-kouachi-charlie-
hebdo.html?emc=edit_na_20150117&nlid=67698734&_r=0. 
37 See Zack Beauchamp, Why the US has the Most Pro-Israel Foreign 
Policy in the World, VOX (July 24, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/5929705/us-israel-friends (explaining that the 
United States maintains strong ties with Israel). 
38 SINGER, supra note 7, at 11. 
39 Id. at 18. 
40 Id. at 17. 
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regional structures, continued stagnant political systems, and weak 
infrastructure, Middle Eastern youth will lack the opportunities 
necessary to fulfill their aspirations, leading up to what the World 
Economic Forum refers to as a “ticking time-bomb.”41  In addition 
to the lack of opportunities as a contributing factor to a dark future, 
through 2016, ISIS tapped into the population trend to indoctrinate 
fundamentalism in children, training them for jihad.42 
Damaged Israeli, Palestinian, Lebanese, and more recently 
Syrian societies provide a nurturing environment for extremism 
and political violence.43  Moreover, fundamentalist jihadists have 
been exporting the same fundamental ideology used in Saudi 
Arabia into the Central Middle Eastern region, arguably in attempt 
to overpower those states and institute Wahhabist version of Sunni 
Islam.44  The Wahhabist vision is an unyielding form of Islam, 
allowing no room for diversity or disagreement and, instead, is 
dedicated to a militant form of Islam.45  It places jihad on the same 
level as the ‘five pillars’46—Muslim life, prayer, concern for the 
needy, self-purification, and the pilgrimage.  As the ‘five pillars’ 
are mandatory, fundamentalists make jihad mandatory as well, in 
spite of the stark difference in the underlying motivation, where 
peace is clearly a foundation to the ‘five pillars.’47 
Moreover, Middle-Eastern born fundamentalism is 
certainly not contained within any Middle Eastern borders, such 
that it is a global issue.  For instance, the New York Times 
reported in the summer of 2014 that European governments were 
                                                            
41 Id. (quoting World Economic Forum, Roundtable on Arab 
Competitiveness, Doha, Qatar, Apr. 2005). 
42 Mark Townsend, How Islamic State is training child killers in 
doctrine of hate, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2016, 2:20 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/05/islamic-state-trains-purer-
child-killers-in-doctrine-of-hate.  
43 King-Irani, supra note 6, at 373. 
44 See Donald W. Garner & Robert L. McFarland, Suing Islam: Tort, 
Terrorism and the House of Saud, 60 OKLA.  L. REV. 223, 231–32 (2007) 
(noting Saudi Arabia’s uniquely intolerant and dangerous version of Islam now 
resulting in jihad throughout the world and the Saud/Wahhab pact dedicated to 
spreading Sunni Islam).  
45 Id. at 225. 
46 Id. at 233. 
47 Id. 
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paying millions to Al-Qaeda in ransom for kidnappings.48  In 
addition, Islamic militants have been able to recruit and train 
Middle Eastern westerners, including Americans, to fight 
alongside and for the same militant ideology.49  The western 
recruits do not necessarily lack education or employment.50  
According to news reports, the Islamic State has been able to draw 
hundreds of individuals from Europe and elsewhere, where these 
individuals have included educated young men such as Mr. 
Emwazi and Mr. Abusalha, both individuals involved in videos 
showing beheadings.51 Therefore, with respect to Westerners, lack 
of education does not necessarily explain the draw to 
fundamentalism. 
As such, it is arguable that Middle Eastern conditions—the 
conditions that are attracting conflicting internal and regional 
interests—are fostering fundamentalism and, in turn, 
fundamentalists have been able to sell a common cause against 
identifiable enemies such as Western governments and states, 
Israel, and Middle Eastern governments, who traditionally have 
                                                            
48 Rukmini Callimachi, Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda 
Terror, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-
becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html. 
49 See Michael S. Schmidt & Mark Mazzetti, Suicide Bomber From 
U.S. Came Home Before Attack, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/us/suicide-bomber-from-us-came-home-
before-attack.html?emc=edit_na_20140730&nlid=67698734. 
50 See generally Margaret Coker & Jenny Gross, Islamic State Militant 
Known as ‘Jihadi John’ Identified, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2015, 7:08 PM),  
https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-militant-known-as-jihadi-john-
identified-1424955642 (reporting on Mr. Emwazi as a university-educated 
Londoner, and identified as the masked Islamic State militant appearing in 
videos showing the beheading of hostages); Kenan Malik, Opinion, 
Assimilation’s Failure, Terrorism’s Rise, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2011) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/opinion/07malik.html (analyzing why so 
many young men, intelligent and integrated, found violence and reactionary 
ideology attractive.). 
51 See generally Coker & Gross, supra note 50; Mark Mazzetti, et al., 
Suicide Bomber Is Identified as a Florida Man, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/world/middleeast/american-suicide-
bomber-in-syria.html (reporting that Americans, traveling to Syria to fight with 
the Nusra group against the Syrian government, come from diverse backgrounds 
and upbringings, including Mr. Abusalha as a suicide bomber in Syria). 
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followed tyrannical rule. 
D. Devaluation of Human Life and Violation of Human Rights 
1. Priorities of the Leaders in Central Middle Eastern States 
It is clear that international law does not extend to the 
Middle East, possibly due in part to a culture that repels critical 
questions and, in the process, frustrates the application of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and deflects attempts at 
criminal prosecutions and restorative justice.52 At the same time, it 
is also likely that human rights law is not a priority and is at best 
third to the conflicting interests and the pervasive political 
instability in the region.   
The Syrian and Jordanian governments are known for 
disregarding human rights.  Bejesky quotes a former CIA agent 
and states, “[i]f you want a serious interrogation, you send a 
prisoner to Jordan.  If you want them to be tortured, you send them 
to Syria.”53  In 2004, American immigration officials informed a 
travelling Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, that he would be sent to 
Syria to be tortured; American officials delivered on their promise 
and sent Mr. Arar to Jordanian officials who in turn transferred 
him to Syria.54  The Syrians interrogated Mr. Arar for eighteen 
hours a day for twelve days, regularly beat him with an electrical 
cable, and struck him with their fists.55  More recently, in 2011, 
human rights organizations called on the United Nations Security 
                                                            
52 King-Irani, supra note 6, at 372. 
53 Robert Bejesky, Sensibly Construing the “More Likely Than Not” 
Threshold for Extraordinary Rendition, 23 KAN. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 221, 241 
(2013); Layla Nadya Sadat, “Torture and the War on Terror”: Ghost Prisoners 
and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 309, 314 (2006)) (quoting Fact Sheet: Extraordinary Rendition, 
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/fact-sheet-extraordinary-rendition (last 
visited July 18, 2019)). 
54 Katherine R. Hawkins, The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic 
Assurances and the Legality of "Rendition”, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 213, 213–14 
(2006). 
55 Id. at 214. 
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Council to act and address the Syrian government’s brutal 
crackdown against civilian protesters.56 
As for Lebanon, in 2013 the United of States Department 
of State reported that human rights abuses include, among others, 
torture, harsh prison conditions, harassment, and arbitrary arrest 
and detention of Syrian political activists.57 
The Israeli government also continuously violates human 
rights laws.  In the 1990’s, Israel subjected suspected Palestinian 
militants to detention without trial and interrogation methods that 
included binding, hooding, and sleep deprivation.58  While torture 
methods may have changed in Israel due to an Israeli Supreme 
Court ruling in 1999,59 violations of human rights against 
Palestinians persist which include rights to self-determination and 
to property.60   
One broad example of human rights violations that Middle 
Eastern states and their leaders have implemented is emergency 
law, particularly in Syria and Israel.  The doctrine of emergency 
                                                            
56 Andrew Baskin, Human Rights Organizations Seek to Refer Syria to 
The International Criminal Court, 27 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 1010 (2011). 
57 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & 
LABOR, LEBANON 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT  1 (2012), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid
=204372 
58 Jennifer Moore, Practicing What We Preach: Humane Treatment for 
Detainees in the War on Terror, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 33, 42 (2006). 
59 See id. at 43; HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. 
Israel 53(4) PD 817, para. 39 (1999) (“[a] democracy must sometimes fight with 
one hand tied behind it’s back”); Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role 
of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 21 (2002) (noting 
the tension between the need to protect the state and the rights of the individual 
in the context of threats of terrorism).  
60 Rep. of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to 
Investigate the Implications of the Israeli Settlements on The Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the Palestinian People Throughout the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/22/63 (2013) [hereinafter Situation in Palestine] (discussing Israel is 
clearly violating Palestinians' right to self-determination and the right to 
determine how to implement self-determination and the right to permanent 
sovereignty); Comm. on Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination, 
Concluding Observations: Israel, para. 25 CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, (April 3, 
2012) (Israel's planning and zoning policy in East Jerusalem, as well as in other 
parts of the West Bank, breaches Palestinian's fundamental rights). 
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law is a last resort mechanism implemented for the common good, 
temporarily suspending certain freedoms to facilitate the return of 
normalcy.61  The Syrian government implemented and maintained 
an emergency state for approximately fifty years, all in the name of 
the enemy Israel.62  The Israeli government continues to maintain 
its emergency state.63  Repeated use of emergency law by ruling 
powers does not necessarily mean to restore normalcy, but is more 
to maintain control and  convince their populations that it is 
necessary.64 
 These are the choices those in power make.  Leaders can 
choose to work towards peace and co-existence, or choose control 
through oppression and discrimination.  One mitigating factor may 
be the balancing of interests.  Thus far, political leaders as well as 
leaders of factions in the Middle East have either confused the 
definition of statehood or used it to their advantage, such that they 
consistently connect statehood to ethnicity and religion.  This is 
true for Assad's regime in Syria, the kings of Jordan, the leaders in 
Israel, the Palestinian movements, and, less so but still, the polity 
in Lebanon.  This is largely because the interests of each group 
separately outweigh the interests of the population in general.  For 
instance, Israel has stronger interests in acquiring land and 
Judaizing the area under its control as opposed to treating non-
Jews like Palestinians equally, or promoting Palestinian self-
determination.65  Similarly in Syria, the Assad regime has a 
                                                            
61 John Reynolds, Emergency, Governmentality, and the Arab Spring, 
JADALIYYA (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2357/emergency-governmentality-and-
the-arab-spring. 
62 See Shubra Ohri, International Legal Updates: Human Rights in an 
Arab Spring, 18 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 45, 46 (2011) (discussing the emergency 
decrees of governments of Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, and Yemen that violated 
international law by prohibiting the rights to assemble and freedom of 
expression). 
63 See Yoav Mehozay, The Fluid Jurisprudence of Israel’s Emergency 
Powers: Legal Patchwork as a Governing Form, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 137, 
137 (2012) (discussing Israel's complex emergency jurisprudence). 
64 Ohri, supra note 62, at 46. 
65 See Situation in Palestine, supra note 60, ¶¶ 59, 61 (reporting that the 
Israeli government aims to alter the composition of Jerusalem by erasing 
cultural heritage on the basis of religious affiliation, by emphasizing Jewish 
cultural heritage while disregarding the heritage of other cultures); see also id. 
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stronger interest in maintaining control as opposed to allowing 
Sunnis to attain power.66 
2. Torture, Discrimination and Inequalities 
Current governments, certainly in Israel, Syria, Lebanon, 
Palestine, and Jordan, devalue and disrespect human life to the 
point that killing and torture are pervasively accepted norms.67 
Two of the worst offenders of human rights in the Middle East 
may be Syria and Israel.68  It remains, however, that all of the five 
states continue to disregard international law and conventions such 
that victims remain individually and collectively 
unacknowledged.69  These states kill and torture indiscriminately 
in the name of state security.70  Unfortunately, the standards we 
have achieved in International Humanitarian Law appear to be 
considered as formalities, possibly seen as unachievable, as 
opposed to standards towards which to aspire. 
 The United States is a prime suspect in this regard, being at 
the forefront of torture techniques, and as such, implicitly 
                                                            
para. 68 (reporting that East Jerusalem's Palestinian population experience 
forced evictions, discriminatory building regulations, demolition orders, 
residence permit restrictions, and acute housing shortage). 
66 See generally William R. Polk, Understanding Syria: From Pre-Civil 
War to Post-Assad, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/understanding-syria-
from-pre-civil-war-to-post-assad/281989/ (explaining that the Assad regime 
instills fear to maintain control). 
67 See, e.g., Oren Liebermann, Palestinian authorities routinely 'arrest 
and torture' critics, says Human Rights Watch report, CNN (Oct. 23, 2018, 
3:09PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/23/middleeast/west-bank-gaza-human-
rights-watch-report-intl/index.html. 
68 King-Irani, supra note 6, at 372–73. 
69 Id. at 377–78. 
70 See also Liebermann, supra note 67 (“‘We documented dozens of 
cases of people detained for a Facebook post, for writing a critical article in a 
mainstream publication, for protesting, for being involved with the wrong group 
or movement,’ said Omar Shakir, Israel-Palestine director for HRW, at a press 
conference in Ramallah announcing the report. In detention, detainees routinely 
are threatened, beaten, subjected to foot whipping, in many cases subjected to 
torture.”). 
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permitting and encouraging other states to follow suit.71  Granted, 
torture and torture techniques are not new.  Europeans, and the 
Ottomans before them, used such techniques, colonized, and 
implemented apartheid in numerous parts of the world.72  
However, humanity collectively has chosen to articulate 
humanitarian law and to aspire to its standards.   
Yet, the Syrian regime continues to capture and torture any 
person speaking or alluding to opposing the regime; this practice 
has continued to a larger scale and became even more focused 
when the opposition began in 2011.73  For example, Syrian 
intelligence is documented to beat and murder members of the 
Kurdish population, including women, who voiced or were 
suspected of voicing any opposition.74 
 Jewish Israelis consider their country democratic, and go as 
far as considering it the only democratic state in the Middle East;75 
yet, the extent of democracy goes only as far as voting does, 
allowing non-Jews to vote, but in fact effecting an ethnic 
democracy76 and extending aspects of democracy only to the 
Jewish portion of the population.  Some argue that Israel has 
                                                            
71 See generally USA and Torture: A History of Hypocrisy, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 9, 2014, 9:04 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/09/usa-and-torture-history-hypocrisy. 
72 See generally History.com Editors, Ottoman Empire, HISTORY.COM 
(last updated Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/middle-
east/ottoman-empire. 
73 See generally Joe Sterling, Daraa: The spark that lit the Syrian 
flame, CNN (Mar. 1, 2012, 9:32 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2012/03/01/world/meast/syria-crisis-
beginnings/index.html (“When the schoolchildren were arrested in late February 
2011, they were accused of scrawling graffiti on a school that said ‘the people 
want to topple the regime.’ Masalmeh, the activist, said security went to a 
school, interrogated students and rounded up suspects.”). 
74 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS 
& LABOR, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: SYRIA 2–3 
(2011), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/160478.pdf. 
75 Roger I. Zakheim, Israel in the Human Rights Era: Finding A Moral 
Justification for the Jewish State, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1005, 1008 
(2004). 
76 See id. at 1010–13 (explaining why Israel is considered an “ethnic 
democracy”). 
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developed a class system, inherent in its legal code.77  The 
government heavily discriminates against any non-Jew.78  Israeli 
Arabs are heavily underrepresented,79 in spite of the 'democratic' 
voting, and even when they are represented, those in power often 
censure and threaten anyone who speaks or acts unfavorably, 
calling such a person anti-Israel and a conspirer.  Moreover, in the 
context of the Occupied Territories, Israel goes as far as to 
implement policies of collective punishment against Palestinians.80 
 These methods have not worked for either Syria or Israel, 
certainly not for the region in light of continued violence and 
conflicts; the methods have not achieved anything that resembles 
peace or stability.  Israelis are more fearful than in preceding years 
as hatred between Jews and Arabic-speaking Palestinians 
continues to grow.81 
III. CURRENT STATE AND LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL 
MIDDLE EAST IS THE ROOT OF THE REGION’S POLITICAL 
INSTABILITY, MIDDLE-EASTERN RELATED TERRORISM, AND 
MIDDLE-EASTERN FUNDAMENTALISM 
A. Numerous Conflicting Interests 
Conflicts, old and new, have been persistent and long-lived 
in virtually all parts of the Central Middle East.  Israel has had its 
                                                            
77 See id. at 1013 (“In Israel, for example, the emerging constitution 
does not enjoin the state from exhibiting partiality towards the different cultural, 
ethnic, and religious conceptions of its majority”).  
78 See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ, Soc, and 
Cultural Rts, Rep. on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions, ¶ 237, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1998/26 (1999) (“The Committee notes with grave concern that the 
Status Law of 1952 authorizes the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency 
and its subsidiaries, including the Jewish National Fund, to control most of the 
land in Israel, since these institutions are chartered to benefit Jews exclusively.”) 
79 Yousef T. Jabareen, Constitution Building and Equality in Deeply-
Divided Societies: The Case of the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 26 WIS. 
INT'L L.J. 345, 349 (2008). 
80  John Dugard & John Reynolds, Apartheid, International Law, and 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 867, 903 (2013). 
81 Daniel Bar-Tal & Eran Halperin, Societal Beliefs and Emotions as 
Socio-Psychological Barriers to Peaceful Conflict Resolution, 19 PALESTINE-
ISR. J. POL’Y, ECON. & CULTURE 18, 22–23 (2014). 
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disputes with Palestinians, just as Hamas demands support from its 
Palestinian civilians.82  Syria, prior to its civil war, focused much 
of its efforts and interests in weakening Israel’s position and 
gaining leverage possibly by supporting Hamas against Israel.  
Interests from regional states have included support for Hamas 
from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar;83 similarly with Lebanon’s 
Hezbollah, which is reputed to receive support from Iran. 
As for global powers, arguably through 2010, the United 
States for example maintained a policy of preventing democracy 
and supporting dictators, with the view that the Muslim public 
would act against United States’ interests if democracy were to 
take hold.84  In turn, Middle Eastern dictators have oppressed their 
people, including in Syria and Jordan, leading to unfavorable 
economic as well as political conditions.85  With such support from 
the West, ruling powers in the Arabic-speaking world failed to 
address issues that generally give rise to social unrest, and were 
unable to provide substantive stability and economic development 
because these powers were rather preoccupied with maintaining 
control.86  These conditions have combined to nourish radicalism, 
supporting Singer’s argument that radical movements require 
leadership along with unfavorable economic and political 
conditions.87 
 This picture demonstrates the multi-level conflicting 
interests, those internal to Central Middle Eastern states, as well as 
                                                            
82 See Shira Rubin, Palestinians have spent decades battling Israel. 
Now they’re battling each other, VOX (Aug. 22, 2017, 9:00AM), 
https://www.vox.com/world/2017/8/22/16114696/palestinian-hamas-israel-
independence-netanyahu-abbas-trump. 
83 See Hannibal Travis, Wargaming the “Arab Spring”: Predicting 
Likely Outcomes and Planning U.N. Responses, 46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 75, 84 
(2013) (noting also Al-Jazeera as a powerful political and social phenomenon 
with a consistent objective and with seed money from Qatar). 
84 See, e.g., Nader Hashemi, The Arab Spring, U.S. Foreign Policy, and 
the Question of Democracy in the Middle East, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
31, 32, 35 (2012). 
85 See Tibi, supra note 10, at 195–96 (noting that Arab Middle Eastern 
have maintained stability through coercion and oppressive intelligence service, 
but have become weaker while neighboring states such as Turkey and Iran have 
grown stronger). 
86 Id. at 198. 
87 SINGER, supra note 7, at 8. 
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those regional and global.  For example, internal conflicting 
interests exist between Syria, Lebanon and Israel.  Regional 
conflicting interests include those of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran, 
who all have maintained support for various brokers internal to 
Central Middle Eastern states.88  Global interests include those of 
the United States as one global power that has maintained a policy 
best suited for its own interests.  While the picture and “alliances” 
may have changed somewhat post-2010, the presence of multi-
level conflicting interests has only grown.   
In late 2010, the Arab Spring took off in several Middle 
Eastern and North African countries, and continues in some form 
in Syria.89  As a Central Middle Eastern state, the conflict in Syria 
exemplifies the multi-level conflicting interests because of internal, 
regional, and global involvements.  
The rebellion in Syria began with, mildly stated, citizenry 
dissatisfaction.  It started with protests in a city situated south of 
Damascus.90  The protests soon spread into other cities, with 
demands for alleviating emergency law and for dismembering the 
Syrian security and intelligence forces.91  The ruling party—the 
Assad government—eventually relented in regard to the 
emergency law, but not in regard to the security forces.92  The 
rebels escalated their protests and demanded that Assad step 
down.93  The protests became an armed conflict within a few 
months, with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and likely Turkey, reputed to 
have provided weapons and financial support to the rebels.94  
                                                            
88 See Marc Lynch, The New Arab Order, 97 FOREIGN AFF., 116, 118, 
121 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-08-13/new-arab-
order. 
89 See Arab Spring, HISTORY.COM,  
https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/arab-spring (last updated Apr. 5, 
2019). 
90 See Sterling, supra note 73. 
91 See Thilo Marauhn, Sailing Close to the Wind: Human Rights 
Council Fact-Finding in Situations of Armed Conflict-the Case of Syria, 43 CAL. 
W. INT'L L.J. 401, 403 (2013). 
92 Khaled Yacoub Oweis Syria's Assad ends state of emergency, 
REUTERS, Apr. 20, 2011, 8:53 PM,  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-idUSTRE72N2MC20110421 
93 Marauhn, supra note 91, at 403. 
94 See Patrick Smith, Obama is Facing 2 Critical Questions to 
Negotiating Peace in Syria, THE FISCAL TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016, 7:43 PM), 
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Neither side appeared to gain enough ground.  Eventually, there 
were foreign fighters on the streets kidnapping Christians and 
implementing Islamic courts in various cities of the country.95   
By 2014, fighters claiming to be part of the Islamic State 
were appearing in the northeastern parts of the country as well as 
in northern Iraq96.  In 2016, such fighters were not only inflicting 
pain and fear among various populations, but were also providing 
an appeal to numbers of young men and women.97  Highlighting 
the concept of conflicting interests, Syria’s government has 
considered the opposition as terrorism supported by outside 
interests.98 
As a militant group that preceded IS, Al-Qaeda came into 
public view in conjunction with the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 
late 1990s.99  While such movements made appearances across 
other parts of the Middle East and Africa, these appearances were 
sporadic and their connectedness appeared minimal.100  However, 





95 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, Islamic State in Syria abducts at least 150 
Christians, REUTERS, Feb. 25, 2015, 3:28 AM,  
 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-christians/islamic-
state-in-syria-abducts-at-least-150-christians-idUSKBN0LS0MH20150224. 
96 See Zack Beauchamp, et al., 27 maps that explain the crisis in Iraq, 
VOX (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-crisis-iraq. 
97 See Ayman S. Ibrahim, What Makes ISIS Appealing, FIRST THINGS 
(Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2014/10/what-
makes-isis-appealing; Jethro Mullen, What is ISIS’ Appeal for Young People, 
CNN (Feb. 25, 2015, 2:33 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/25/middleeast/isis-kids-propaganda/index.html. 
98 ‘Terrorism exported to Middle East from Europe’ – Assad, RT (Dec. 
4, 2014, 10:45 PM), https://www.rt.com/news/211583-terrorism-syria-europe-
assad/. 
99 See The U.S. War in Afghanistan 1999–2019, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan (last visited May 
20, 2019) (laying out Al-Queda’s and the Taliban’s timeline). 
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these movements have shown gradual growth through the first 
decade of the 21st century, and then through the Arab Spring in 
numbers and strength, with support from Persian Gulf countries, 
particularly Qatar.101  Qatar, by 2013, has also been cited to have 
security and diplomatic links to Israel and the United States.102   
ISIS’ activities in Syria and Iraq point to the continued 
growth of conflicting interests.  One obvious reason such 
movements must not be allowed to take hold is human rights and 
atrocities.   Recent news of kidnappings and the payment of 
ransoms to Al-Qaeda and its direct affiliates in Europe103 as well as 
violence, can easily take hold in the United States if all the 
involved nation-states maintain their current trajectories.104  Thus, 
one must consider Middle Eastern affairs after 2010, of Al-Qaeda, 
of IS, of fundamentalists kidnaping Europeans,105 and of 
population trends in the Middle East,106 in conjunction with and as 
part of one picture. 
                                                            
47, 48–49, 69 (2007) (analyzing Al-Qaeda’s presence, success, and in regard to 
some terrorist attacks lack of evidence of involvement). 
101 See David Ignatius, How ISIS Spread in the Middle East and How to 
Stop it, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2015) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-
syria-iraq/412042/ (noting “[i]t was Saudi Arabia and Qatar, jockeying for 
regional influence, that funded a scattershot array of Sunni militias that proved 
easy recruiting grounds for the extremists . . .”); Editorial Board, Opinion, 
Fighting, While Funding, Extremists, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/opinion/saudi-arabia-qatar-isis-
terrorism.html (pointing to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Iran as supporters of 
extremist groups; for example, noting that Qatar has supported radicals in Syria, 
and noting that while Saudi Arabia has become more serious against extremism 
and has “taken a zero-tolerance approach to ISIS . . . American government 
reports say financial support for terrorism from Saudis remains a threat . . . .”). 
102 See Travis, supra note 83, at 79.   
103 Callimachi & Yardley, supra note 36; Callimachi, supra note 48. 
104 See, e.g., Marc Santora & Stephanie Clifford, 3 Brooklyn Men 
Accused of Plot to Aid ISIS’ Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015), 
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The threat is present in Europe arguably in part because 
radicals use European systems, including criminal justice systems 
and prisons, while European governments fail to distinguish 
between a contributing citizen and a dormant-appearing radical, or 
fail to embrace individuals with Middle Eastern backgrounds.107  A 
more frightening concept is that this same threat, today in Syria 
and Iraq, can easily reach European countries and the United 
States.  The radical movements demonstrate the conflicts, and the 
conflicting interests.  The movements themselves receive support 
and aid.  More importantly, however, is that it is the political 
structure that is allowing such movements to thrive through the 
multi-level interests as opposed to a cohesive internal political and 
legal system. 
Hashemi argues that two basic priorities intersect in the 
region—oil, and the State of Israel.108  From another perspective, 
Tibi implies that the instability arises from a fundamental conflict 
between secular nationalists and their foes, where secular 
nationalists are committed to the existing Middle Eastern nation-
state system, while their foes seek a regional order based on their 
understanding of Islamic teachings.109  Tibi argues that the regional 
Arab states, post-Ottoman and post-colonial periods and until 
losing the West Bank in the Six-Day War of 1967, believed that 
only the pan-Arab state encompassing all of the Arab-speaking 
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lands could be a real nation-state.110  Tibi adds that the defeat in 
the Six-Day War gave rise to political Islam as the greatest 
challenge to pan-Arabism and the secular nation-state system.111 
 Thus, while oil and Israel are unarguably basic priorities, it 
is the lack of sustainable political and legal structures that allows 
the multi-level conflicting interests to be born and to flourish—
interests from players supporting the existing nation-state structure, 
versus those seeking to alter it and gain control over the region.  
The players are not only internal, but also regional and global 
because it is clear that foreign policies from regional and global 
players exacerbate and promote radicalism, both directly and 
indirectly, depending on what those regional/global players believe 
would best serve their interests.  This is an unsustainable status—
there will be a time when force, whether militant at one extreme or 
a conflict between global powers at the other, will become 
uncontrollable. 
1. Current State and Legal Structure Invites and Harbors 
Numerous Conflicting Interests 
Attempts by Arabic-speaking nations at establishing 
regional agreements have failed112 in turn resulting in 
fragmentation that, combined with weak statehoods, has supported 
Israel’s Likud’s belief in its supremacy and its continuing 
intransigence.113  In addition, arguably in response, many Middle 
Eastern governments have used the Arab-Israeli conflict to 
institutionalize ‘national security’ as a top priority and to relegate 
all other social and political problems, including ecological 
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degradation, gender, race, class inequalities, abuses of human 
rights, and attacks on cultural identities, to lower statuses.114  
The focus on national security is one explanation for a rise 
and exacerbation of conflicting interests and the growth and 
consistency of terrorism as a method by the non-established state.  
Conditions that can lead to terrorism include:  the United States’ 
interests in preventing democracies l; fundamentalist Muslims 
looking to establish Islamic states; Syrians seeking to regain lost 
territories; and other regional powers seeking to further their 
political goals. One factor contributing to Middle Eastern-rooted 
terrorism, is the desire to lay claim on land—e.g. Syria and 
Palestine are Muslim countries interested in establishing Islamic 
rule, and Israel is a Jewish state, interested in laying claim to the 
region and imposing its values.115  Thus, terrorism in the region is 
about controlling the land and what words are instituted into that 
state’s legal code regarding its religious identity. 
Therefore, to resolve Middle Eastern conflicts there must 
be consideration of attempts to lay claim to the other lands, along 
with the attempts to impose religious and ethnic values.  Further 
inquiry on whether the current political structure: (1) gives rise to 
or supports the conflicting interests; (2) is too fragile to support 
these conflicting interests; and (3) fails to satisfy the interests of 
religious identities and interests should be done.   
The borders between Syria, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, and 
Jordan force these states to have conflicts rather than to favor 
cooperation, because each state’s interests outweigh the common 
interests among the other four states.  For instance, Syria has 
historically been unwilling to recognize Israel as a state, and has 
supported groups like Hezbollah, which threaten Israel’s 
security.116  As a result, Israel, who seeks security, will not return 
Syria’s territories, currently occupied by Israel.117  Therefore, 
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interests in establishing security and in regaining land have 
substantially outweighed interests in cooperation as evidenced by 
continual disagreement, insecurity, and covert operations.  
In addition, there are conflicts within each of the five states 
arising from oppressive governments and lack of economic 
leadership and development.  For example, Syria’s Sunni 
population, as demonstrated by the Syrian rebelling forces 
opposing its government and Syria’s civil war, has become 
unwilling to continue under Assad’s Alawite government.118  
Lebanon struggles internally to build a sustainable coalition 
between its primary religious groups – Muslim Sunnis, Muslim 
Shiites, and Christians.119  Moreover, Israel struggles to reconcile 
with its non-Jewish Palestinian population.120  Thus, the current 
political structure has been promoting conflicts because the 
structure promotes insecurity.   
Furthermore, these five states lack legal structures that can 
meet security and land interests because each of these states has 
been able to serve the interests of only a portion of its population 
but not the whole.  The internal conflicting interests also give rise 
to regional conflicting interests and global conflicting interests.  
Regional powers each have interests that overlap with certain 
factions within the five states, leading to economic as well as 
military support to those factions; for example, Saudi Arabia has 
an interest in supporting Sunni groups, while Iran has interest in 
supporting Shiite groups.  Global powers choose sides and also 
support regional powers aligned with the interests of that global 
power.  In the conflict between Syria and Israel, for example, Syria 
appears to receive military and strategic support from Iran and 
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Russia,121 while Israel appears to receive various forms of support 
including diplomatic and military support, from the United States 
and in prior years from Turkey.122   Lebanon’s Hezbollah, in its 
struggles against Israel, receives support from Iran.123  In sum, 
each internal party has at least one regional ally as well as some 
global support.  
In summary, the current political structure promotes 
conflict, while the five states continue to lack a legal structure that 
supports cooperation.  The conflicts only grow as the conflicts 
reach regional and global states. The five states cannot handle 
internal conflicts because these states exist under the premise that 
the other is illegitimate.  Each of the five states lacks the legal 
structure to support all of its populations and any inter-state 
cooperation, and thus to handle internal conflicts. 
2. Marriage of Church and State 
The paramount issues in the Middle East with regards to 
stability revolve around the religious and ethnic conflicts.124  The 
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nation-state is by definition secular.125  Israel likely violates this 
notion since it defines itself as a Jewish State in its Basic Law.126  
Other ruling powers in the Middle East use Islam to legitimize 
their secular rule and to counter-forces that challenge this 
legitimacy.127  Islamic fundamentalism’s goal of establishing an 
Islamic State cannot be shaken, and their inclusion within state 
institutions is unlikely to change their world view in part due to 
pursuing order based on divine worldviews.128 
The Israeli marriage of religion with the state is not 
necessarily supported by the majority of Jewish Israelis.129  
Further, the Zionist movement has taken a step beyond the 
marriage of religion and state in considering Judaism a race, a 
notion that certainly is not universal among the rest of the Jewish 
community and has offended emancipationist Jews.130  Zionist 
leaders required conformism, which led to bullying tactics against 
non-compliant Jews.131  Zionist leaders and Israeli politicians have 
interpreted support for practical Zionism as a Jewish obligation, as 
necessary for Jewish survival, and even as national liberation for 
Jews.132 The Israeli High Court in 1971 affirmed that “there is no 
Israeli nation separate from the Jewish nation . . . composed not 
only of those residing in Israel but also of Diaspora Jewry.”133   
Unfortunately, this Zionist ideology creates an unwanted 
and unhelpful barrier between those of the Jewish faith and their 
neighbors.134   The creation of a race identity for those of the 
Jewish faith encourages stereotyping and seeks to provide a 
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scientific basis for discrimination, in contradiction to international 
efforts that seek to combat racism.135 
By the same token, fundamental Islamists allege Sharia is 
divine; thus, Islamic Sharia is incompatible with the nation-state 
model because it stands in contrast to popular sovereignty, in turn 
making political Islamism and democracy incompatible.136   For 
instance, Islam is a religion and not a concept of order or political 
structure, and, as such, the concept of Islamic State is rather an 
expression of a revolt against the Western-led nation-state and the 
ruling Middle Eastern class.137  Islamic Sharia has an expansive 
substantive reach that permeates public and private life, creating 
the additional challenge of treating non-Muslims as subjects with 
inferior political, legal, and religious rights.138   More troubling is 
that institutional fundamentalism is more dangerous than terrorism 
“because its followers act within the system and are in a position to 
remake the existing order” without substantial resistance and 
without resorting to violence or force.139 
Some sources of outside support for fundamentalist 
movements are current fundamentalist regimes in the region—Iran, 
Sudan, Saudi Arabia—as well as the international fundamentalist 
network as a logistical support system developed in Western 
Europe.140 
The current political structure in the Central Middle East 
encourages conflict in large part because policies and interests in 
each of the five states, and each movement within the states, 
oppose fundamental claims, such as the existence of Israel or the 
Alawites being in the government seat.  A Jewish state by 
definition cannot tolerate Islamic Sharia in its code; neither can a 
proclaimed secular Syria.  Thus, the continuation of the marriage 
of church and state in the Central Middle Eastern states blocks any 
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roadmap towards cooperation and co-existence between the area’s 
peoples and governments.  As such, this marriage must be removed 
as part of a larger political and legal structure in order to subdue 
the instability and address the conflicting interests. 
3. Economics 
After the oil boom in the 1970s, Middle Eastern economies 
shifted from being agricultural and textile markets to being 
primarily single commodity exporters, primarily exporting oil.141   
Meanwhile, most of these countries have resisted reform in 
business organization and continue to place roadblocks against 
business creation, arguably because new business, particularly 
small businesses, generally lead to a rise in the middle class, where 
a middle class would likely create pressures for democratic 
reforms.142  Incumbent ruling elites oppose economic development 
when it is likely to lead to social change that threatens the rulers’ 
hold on power.143  Another indication of the lack of economic 
development is that Arabic-speaking states have the fewest trade 
arrangements in the world and have not integrated into the 
international economic community.144  Moreover, border politics 
between the Central Middle Eastern countries, along with Iraq, 
complicate and stagnate existing trade.145 
Another issue is the dislike of Western policies, particularly 
those of the United States, which “prevents reform because market 
liberalization is branded as western cultural imperialism.”146  
“Universalization is the acceptance of one set of cultural norms 
and values,” whereas globalization refers to economic 
interdependence; it is Western universalization that Islamists 
oppose.147  In addition, tensions and conflicts with Israel, along 
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with the war on terror, have slowed trade relations with western 
countries.148 
Middle Eastern countries with external threats, such as 
Lebanon and Israel, permit new businesses to open because growth 
is needed in order to generate the resources necessary to provide 
security.149  On the other hand, countries with few external threats, 
such as Syria, have had weak incentives to generate growth or to 
tolerate political dissent.150   
Thus, the current political structures in the five states have 
either intentionally hindered economic development through 
policies of isolation, or have supported economic development as a 
means to finance the battles against insecurity and opposing 
movements.  In short, none of the five states have been able to 
encourage economic development and ties with other states solely 
for the goal of economic development.  In turn, the lack of 
economic development for its own benefits continues to support 
rhetoric from fundamentalist groups and leaders.  Thus, the five 
states are in need of legal structure and policies that: (1) support 
development; and (2) do so for the sake of development and not for 
the sake of propagating the status quo. 
B. Internal Interests: Central Middle Eastern Countries, and 
Why it is this Political Structure—Between Syria, Jordan, 
Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon—That Must Be Addressed 
At the core of the issue is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
The issue itself is probably best described in terms of control.  
Israel looks to control the area, likely looking for a safe haven for 
those of the Jewish faith. This is easily taken to an extreme, 
however, when there is no neutral legal foundation.  Israel's Basic 
Law declares that Israel is a Jewish State.151  Furthermore, Israel 
incorporates into its legal foundation entities such as the Jewish 
National Fund, whose mission is specifically to preserve land for 
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the betterment of those of the Jewish faith.152  On the opposite end, 
are the those of the Islamic faith, particularly Arabic-speaking 
Muslims, whose mission is to declare every state in the region a 
Muslim-Arab State.153  
 Simply stated, those of the Jewish faith want the land to be 
ruled by Judaism, and those of the Muslim faith want the land to be 
ruled by Islam.  This concept expands in the extreme direction with 
every inch granted.  It is such an approach and attempt at control 
that Middle Eastern states and peoples must thwart.  The moderate 
voice is lost in between the turmoil, and effectively is either forced 
to join or remains silent for fear of retribution.   
 The land is not Jewish, Muslim, or Christian.  Whether 
such was the case in the past, or whether such approach was 
effective in the past, is not as relevant.  It is not working for today's 
societies; moreover, the international community has reached a 
consensus against such an approach.  The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International 
Convention on Elimination of All Form of Racial Discrimination 
both recognize non-discrimination as a right.154  A legal foundation 
that includes religion, ethnicity, or a defined group in its code, is 
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inherently discriminatory and is inclined to lead to hegemony.155  
Moreover, considering a land belonging to a faith or a person is 
counter to every one of these religions because such an approach 
obstructs human growth.  Such labeling under the guise of the 
betterment of humanity encourages one path to overpower another, 
thus, promoting its existence and growth while hinders all others.   
 Palestinians and Jewish Israelis alone cannot solve the 
issue, history and the present times profess as much.156  The two 
groups have found it near impossible to come to any sustainable 
terms within the past sixty years or so, arguably because of 
competing and contradictory terms.  The Oslo agreement was 
difficult to reach, and has proven to be more difficult to 
implement.  The Palestinians argue that they made too many 
concessions and that the agreement was biased towards Israel and 
Israel's interests;157 yet, even with such bias, the two sides have not 
been able to make its terms come to fruition.  There must be 
different circumstances that meet the interests of both sides.  
Further, both sides must concede certain points, particularly the 
attempt at full control along ethnic or religious lines. 
1. Israel’s Interests 
The Israeli government has maintained that Israel is a 
Jewish state.158  Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu included in a 
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2011 speech that the Jewish people have been exposed to an 
agonized odyssey through the centuries and that they finally have a 
home.159  In sum, the paramount interest of those in the Jewish 
faith is security and peaceful living.   
Studies on the opinions of Jewish Israelis shed light on the 
status of these interests, whether it be the interest of peaceful 
living, or the more guarded aspiration of propagating Israel as a 
Jewish state and expanding its current borders.  Bar-Tal and 
Halperin reported on studies that show amongst Jewish Israelis a 
high level of fear of being attacked.160  In 1999, Beres argued that 
Israel was under an ever-higher existential threat due to the 
combination of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
the continued Arab/Islamic enmity towards Israel.161  In 2006, 
Mnookin noted that more than 1000 Israelis and 3000 Palestinians 
had died between the collapse of the Oslo process and 2006, 
pointing to ‘profound internal conflicts’ between Jewish Israelis 
and Palestinians.162  Israel has also had conflict and attacks from 
Lebanese factions near its northern border, such as in 2000 when 
Hezbollah attacked and killed seven Israeli soldiers, to which Israel 
responded with air strikes.163  Thus, it is arguable that Jewish 
Israelis have not acquired the desired status of peaceful living in 
Israel-Palestine.  This is likely a result of a combination of factors: 
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anti-Semitism, Middle Eastern politics and the fundamentalist 
pursuit of Islamic statehoods.  
 Overall, Israel's overarching interest is that the Jewish 
population lives and thrives peacefully and without fear.  Israel’s 
interests are best accomplished when surrounding states accept 
those of the Jewish faith as being members of the region, as having 
a role in the region's direction, and as members of governing and 
decision-making bodies. 
2. Palestine’s Interests 
The primary interest for Palestinians is arguably 
autonomy—self-determination—through statehood, which 
Palestinians claim under international law.164  The Palestinians 
sought for years the return of land, the entirety of what is today 
largely accepted as Israel.165  They have in large part given up on 
such a goal, and have settled on the European concept of the two-
state solution, resting their claim on the boundaries recognized by 
the Security Council.166  Self-determination is a second key interest 
for Palestinians because Israel controls natural resources in the 
Occupied Territories and exports, controls development through 
permits, controls Palestinian entrepreneurial activity that may 
compete with Israeli businesses, and controls Palestinian 
schooling.167 
In pursuit of self-determination, the Oslo agreement was 
the first agreement between Israel and Palestinians that recognized 
Israel as a state and Palestinians as a people with the right to a 
state.168  The Palestinian Liberation Organization agreed with 
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Israel, on certain terms, that the West Bank and Gaza would 
eventually be Palestine; however, this was conditioned on future 
negotiations and were achievable only when the parties reach a 
final settlement agreement.169  At the same time, Israel continues to 
object to Palestinian statehood.170  There are many Palestinians 
who refuse such an agreement and reject the recognition of Israel 
when Israel is unwilling to recognize Palestine as a state.171  
Palestinians also point to Israelis who confiscated hundreds of 
thousands of acres of Palestinian land illegally.172  The question 
then becomes whether the return of any of these lands viable.  If 
not, the question then becomes whether self-determination through 
statehood within Oslo geographical boundaries is viable. 
 Israel has been reluctant to settle issues that would lead to 
reaching a final status agreement, thus, acting to block Palestinian 
independence.173  On the other hand, while Palestinian statehood is 
not universally recognized, 137 states have recognized the State of 
Palestine as of late 2018.174  The remaining states, including Israel, 
take the position that statehood can only be established through 
direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian National 
Council.175 
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 Some Palestinians consider Israel a colonial power with no 
right to most of the properties many of its citizens currently 
hold.176  This is all without beginning to consider Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. 
 By the same token, Israel has consistently violated nearly 
every Fourth Geneva Convention protection.177  Israeli officials 
have sought to affirm a Zionist manifest destiny while denying any 
responsibility or accountability for the negative consequences of 
the 1948 war.178  Picket’s commentary to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention notes that the Convention included the prohibition of 
civilian settlement in an occupied territory “to prevent the 
occupying power from colonizing a territory for political and racial 
reasons.”179 
 Thus, Palestine’s interest in self-determination opposes 
Israel’s interests in control.  Oslo has arguably been unsuccessful 
because it has failed to negotiate terms that satisfy both interests; 
however, the blame cannot be on the Oslo effort, but rather on the 
extreme and opposing interests.  Moreover, the current approaches 
of control on one end and self-determination on the other are too 
conflicting and only exacerbate each side.  This is because the 
implication is one side having to completely give up its interests, 
as opposed to negotiating elements of those interests.  In summary, 
the Palestinian primary interest is self-determination.  This is 
clearly in conflict with Israeli interests of having access beyond 
Israel proper and evident in Israel’s unwillingness to stop and 
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remove settlements in the West Bank. 
3. Syria’s Interests 
Syria has maintained a posture of war towards Israel by not 
recognizing it as a State and continuing to build its army in 
anticipation of a conflict, or possibly in deterrence.180  Syria has 
also maintained its claim to the Golan Heights and its demand that 
Israel relinquish its occupation of the territory.181  At the same 
time, the Assad regime has generally oppressed Syrians and 
subdued certain factions, such as Sunnis and Kurds.182  The war 
stance allowed the government to maintain emergency status for 
over 40 years and oppressive security and intelligence forces as the 
foundation for stability, which arguably prevented the country's 
growth.   
 Syria's interests, however, are not well defined because the 
government has maintained its hold on power as its first priority, 
such that the population's multiple factions continue to have 
differing interests, possibly contradictory in some instances.183  
Thus, the discussion must address two levels: (1) Syria’s political 
and national interests; and (2) the population’s interests. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in turn Syria’s 
response, have in large part played a role in hindering Syria's 
progress and directly, or by proxy, have arguably contributed to a 
weak legal infrastructure.  This is more evident in the face of the 
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Syrian opposition groups and the Islamic State.184  Thus, the 
analysis of Syria's interests must include its national interests, as 
well as the general interests of the population as a whole in 
addition to each of the several factions.  The general interests of 
the population include the overarching principles of stability, 
economic development, equality, and the basic freedoms of speech 
and religion.  
 Unfortunately, Syrians have not been able to establish these 
general interests, which is most likely because of the oppressive 
regime.  It may have been unreasonable to expect the population to 
attain these interests in the face of the government's hold on the 
country, the government's pervasive intelligence and security 
forces, and the government's military strength.  It remains, 
however, that Syria’s various factions, unlike groups in other parts 
of the Middle East, have shown they can co-exist. 
To oppose the government’s oppressive hold, certain 
Syrians appear to have accepted assistance from outside powers 
such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.  As for the 
Islamic State, it is a generally accepted assertion that IS is not, and 
was not, Syrian.185  Granted, there may be some in Syria who look 
for Islamic statehood; however, there is no indication that such 
individuals or groups constitute any substantial numbers.   
 Thus, generally, Syria’s interests are comparatively 
simple—the return of occupied territories, stability, and economic 
development.  Further, Syria’s factions have historically shown 
they can and want to co-exist.186  While there is the argument that 
its government dictated such co-existence, interference from 
outside powers remains to be a greater danger because of the 
                                                            
184 Cf. Kamal Alam, Why Assad’s Army Has Not Defected, NAT’L INT. 
(Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/why-assads-army-has-
not-defected-15190 (arguing that Syria in fact has shown a resilient military 
structure due to its ethnically integrated army and political structure). 
185 See CNN Library, ISIS Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 25, 2019, 4:07 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/index.html (explaining 
that the Islamic State started as an al Qaeda splinter group and aims to create an 
Islamic state called a caliphate across Iraq, Syria and beyond). 
186 Guide to the Syrian opposition, BBC (Oct. 17, 2013), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15798218 (“In November 2012, 
Syrian opposition factions agreed to set up a new and more inclusive leadership 
council at a meeting in Doha, Qatar.”). 
44https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/1
2019] CENTRAL MIDDLE EASTERN STATES 337 
likelihood and the trend that such interference would incite strife 
and radicalization.  The Islamic State is a prime example.  As such, 
Syria’s paramount interest is to prevent radicalization, and to re-
establish stability and security.  Stability will likely require 
rebuilding the government in such a fashion as to also support and 
promote economic development and equality, recognition of 
human rights, and employment of democratic principles. 
4. Lebanon 
Lebanon has had internal conflicts, and arguably continues 
to do so, as well as interfering interests from its two neighbors, 
Syria and Israel.  Over almost four decades and through various 
agreements and legal structures, there have been several attempts 
to resolve the conflicts. The Lebanese Constitution, for instance, is 
unique in the region in that it recognizes the various religious 
groups187 and acts as one attempt to create cohesiveness and order. 
An example of the inexplicable internal conflicts is the 
fighting among the Lebanese Christians, forging alliances with 
other communities against rival Christians.188  The Lebanese civil 
war began in the mid 1970’s; subsequently, then-president 
Suleiman Frangieh requested military assistance from Syria and 
Syrian forces entered the country in 1976.189  Rather than being 
neutral, Syrian forces supported partisan factions.190   
In 1989, leaders of various Lebanese groups finally reached 
an agreement with Syria, known as  the Taif Agreement, 
proscribing transitional Syrian withdrawal by 1991; however, 
contrary to the agreement, Syrian forces remained in the country 
until 2005.191  During its presence through 2005, Syria interfered in 
Lebanese politics and controlled its elections, presidential 
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nominations, and appointments.192  In that period, Syria claimed 
military and economic interests in Lebanon, and also used attacks 
by Hezbollah on Israel as a bargaining tool to regain the Golan 
Heights from Israel.193  Syria, along with Iran,194  has supported 
Hezbollah against Israel. 
As the southern neighbor, Israel is another broker with 
which Lebanon has had to contend.  Israel began military 
intervention in southern Lebanon in the 1960s in response to 
attacks from Palestinian guerrilla groups in the area.195  Eventually, 
in 1982, Israeli forces reached Beirut in a major military offensive 
to drive out the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and then 
remained in the southern parts bordering Israel until 1985.196  
Israel completely withdrew in 2000.197   
In 1997, Lebanon engaged with both Israel and Syria to 
reach an agreement that addressed the rules of conduct under 
which the Israeli-Lebanese conflict would continue.198 The United 
States and France were also present.199   
The agreement allowed both Syria and Israel to perpetuate 
the conflict in a controlled fashion.200  Hezbollah’s attacks on 
Israel in 2000 are an example of the then continued conflict, where 
Israel responded with air strikes.201  By the same token, while it 
was Hezbollah that executed the attacks on Israel’s northern 
border, Israel had in fact to contend with Syria.202  It was 
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questionable whether the attacks and the responses abided by the 
1997 agreement. 
Israel remains, at the minimum, concerned about Hezbollah 
and Hezbollah receiving support from at least Iran.203 Internally, 
Lebanon continues to be divided along sectarian and ideological 
lines while experiencing spillover from the Syrian conflict.204  
Thus, Lebanon’s interests are two-fold. First, an internal legal and 
political structure that can address the divisions between the 
different factions, without political or military interference from its 
neighbors.  Second, stability in its neighbors that allows for 
collaboration and prevents the need to use Lebanon as a battle 
ground or as a proxy. 
5. Jordan 
Interests of Jordanians, and arguably Jordan as a state, 
revolve around democratization and its economy.  Although 
favored, democratization in Jordan is likely difficult without 
regional, legal support, primarily because Jordan is constitutionally 
a Muslim state, such that its king being Muslim is a constitutional 
requirement.205  Such requirements are likely to collide with 
democratic principles, and changes to them would likely face 
strong opposition.  Arguably, only a regional shift in polity and 
legal structure, with incentives in promises of stronger economy, 
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stronger human rights enforcements, and stronger regional 
relationships, but without external cultural values, would defeat 
such opposition.  
Since 1989, Jordan has been a semi-democratic state—one 
that “permit[s] more political competition than autocracies, but less 
than democracies.”206  Social science shows that democratic 
change that shifts Jordan to full democratic status would reduce the 
risk of internal conflict.207  In addition, polls show that Jordanians 
look favorably upon democratic governments.208  In 2011, over 
70% of Jordanians surveyed indicated that “democracy is 
preferable to any other kind of government;” moreover, in 2006, 
more than 80% of Jordanians believed that democracy was the best 
system of government “despite its drawbacks.”209  In regards to its 
legal structure, Jordan’s Constitution combines Islamic law with 
civil code adopted from European states, declaring Islam as the 
state religion while also providing for freedom of religion with 
certain limitations, such as prohibiting conversion from Islam and 
requiring that the King be Muslim.210 
Statistical analysis suggests that civil war and domestic 
terrorism occurs more frequently in semi-democracies, such that 
democratization in such states is likely to reduce the risk of 
instability more quickly than in autocratic states.211  Syria, as an 
autocratic government, may have been able to maintain social 
peace through oppression; however, its capacity to long-term order 
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through such means, as shown by its most recent internal conflict 
that started in 2011, is questionable.212  In addition, Jordan, as well 
as Syria and other Middle Eastern states, is a party to the ICCPR, 
whose Article 25 provides, in part, the right to vote, to be elected at 
periodic elections, and to free expression guarantee.213 
Economically, Jordan would greatly benefit from stronger 
ties, collaboration, and trade with its neighbors.  Its landscape 
being primarily a desert, Jordan lacks the natural resources to be 
able to completely support its population and immigrants from 
conflicts in neighboring states.  Thus, Jordan has interests in 
collaborating economically with its neighbors to help grow its 
industries.  History has shown that improved trade relations 
markedly benefitted Jordan.214  Starting in 1999, Jordan has 
applied a secular approach to international trade and political 
relationships.215  This approach has resulted in more than doubling 
Jordan’s GDP over a 10-year period from 1999 to 2010.216   
Thus, interests of Jordanians arguably include 
democratization and continued economic growth, both of which 
are more likely to come to fruition with stronger ties with and 
support from its direct neighbors. 
C. Regional Interests: Regional Powers—Turkey, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar 
Regional and neighboring countries such as Turkey and 
Iran are becoming stronger militarily and economically.217  Turkey 
has positioned itself in the recent past as an “order-creating” center 
in the region, particularly after abandoning its efforts to join the 
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European Union.218  It has, however, failed to become such a 
force.219  Nonetheless, Turkey is considered as the “winner of the 
Arab Spring” in that it is seen to “have played a constructive role” 
in Arab events and as a model for governments in the region.220  In 
addition, Turkey, specifically the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), recognizes its “strategic location between the Middle East 
and Europe.”221   
Equally important, Turkey also has interests in affecting 
and preventing Kurdish populations from gaining power or 
influence.  Turkey has persistently demonstrated efforts to subdue 
its Kurdish population; it has maintained a policy of military 
opposition against the Kurds, particularly in the southeastern parts 
of the country and bordering Syria.222  Syrian Kurds have gone as 
far as to accuse Turkey of supporting the Islamic State in Syria 
against the Kurds.223   
Iran, on the other hand, has been more directly and openly 
involved in Central Middle Eastern states and the area’s politics.  
Iran has, and continues to, support Syria’s Assad regime,224 
possibly to build strategic and religious ties considering Assad’s 
Alawite’s background.  Thus, Iran’s interests are arguably counter 
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to Turkey’s as each state brokers to maintain or gain influence in 
the area.  
Qatar and Saudi Arabia have also had interests in the area, 
particularly to oppose Iran’s interests.  Qatar and Saudi have 
supported the rebels against the Assad regime225 and against Iran.  
Moreover, it is clear that Qatar supports Syrian rebels against the 
Syrian regime not for interests in democracy, but to support 
establishing a Sunni state, and to oppose the Iran-friendly regime. 
 Saudi Arabia in particular has shown direct influence with 
the conflict in Syria and the spread of Wahhabist Jihad.226  Garner 
and McFarland hold Saudi Arabia responsible for a Wahhabist 
jihad outside of Saudi Arabia’s geographic borders.227  They point 
to “connections between Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabist religious 
establishment and the ideology sustaining worldwide Islamic 
jihad.”228   
In the 18th century, Wahhab created an unyielding form of 
Islam, allowing “no room for diversity or disagreement.” 229  He 
dedicated his life to Taymiyya’s militant message of jihad.230  
Taymiyya was a “fourteenth-century Islamic jurist and scholar” 
who believed that corruption of Islam occurred due to departure 
from strict obedience to Islamic texts and “influences from 
Christianity, Judaism, and paganism.”231  Taymiyya rejected the 
notion that jihad was an optional aspect of Islam.232  Taymiyya 
taught that preservation justified jihad, and authorized jihad in 
defense of “the faith from external infidel forces” such as the 
Mongol invasion and subjugation of the Middle East.  He did not, 
however, authorize jihad against other Muslims.233  Wahhab, on 
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the other hand, moved a step further than Taymiyya and authorized 
jihad against Muslims who were considered apostates.234 
Wahhab’s tribe kicked him out for his style of fundamental 
Islam; thereafter, Wahhab favored Muhammad ibn Saud, a local 
tribal leader.235  Saud formalized his affinity for Wahhab in a pact 
in which Saud adopted Wahhab’s ideology and agreed to protect 
Wahhab and lead the effort to indoctrinate the Arabian 
Peninsula.236  Muhammad ibn Saud, the patriarch of the House of 
Saud in the eighteenth century, met with Mullah Wahhab in 1744 
and cemented the political and religious relationship.237  The Saud-
Wahhab pact dedicated the “Sauds to spreading and securing 
Wahhab’s vision of Sunni Islam.” 238 At the time, the Ottoman 
Empire did not directly control the interior of the Arabian 
Peninsula, thus, allowing the local tribal leaders to emerge as 
governing authorities.239  Saud’s influence outside his tribal 
settlement was limited prior to his alliance with Wahhab.240  With 
the support of Wahhabbi followers, the Saudi tribe was soon able 
to subjugate all the neighboring tribes through a campaign of 
killing and plundering.241  They used Wahhab’s vision to unite the 
tribes under the rule of the House of Saud, paving the path to the 
Saudi Kingdom’s birth in 1932.242  The conquest of the peninsula 
came at a cost of 40,000 public executions and 350,000 
amputations.243  Jihadists have since been using the same ideology 
to wage religious war outside Saudi Arabia’s borders.244 
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Today, Saudi Arabia does not recognize basic freedoms, 
such as freedom of press, thought, or religious expression.245  The 
only religious belief that the Kingdom has allowed throughout its 
history has been Wahhab’s version of Sunni Islam.246  The 
Kingdom’s religious police control the lives of Saudi subjects from 
the day’s attire, to the manner and substance of prayers.247   The 
United States State Department noted in a 2003 report that Mosque 
preachers, paid and supervised by the state, continued violent anti-
Jewish and anti-Christian preaching after 9/11.248  Moreover, the 
Saudi Ministry of Education publishes and permits only ministry-
authorized textbooks, all of which propagate the teachings of 
Wahhab, and, further, bans any books authored by non-Wahhabi 
educators.249  Thus, Saudi Arabia has instilled an intolerant version 
of Islam that in present day, is resulting in Jihad throughout the 
world.250   
 In summary, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in particular, 
each have conflicting interests with each other, and in Central 
Middle Eastern affairs.  Turkey has interests in emerging as an 
influential regional leader and in countering any Kurdish 
stronghold.  Iran has interests in supporting and maintaining ties 
with Syria’s Assad regime and with Hezbollah against Israel.  
Saudi has interests in opposing any Iranian influence in the area or 
Iranian ties with the area’s governments and groups.  Each of these 
interests not only conflict, but also support and exacerbate internal 
conflicting interests. 
D. Global Interests: The Global Powers—United States, 
European Union, Russia, China 
The United States, along with other western powers, has 
supported and preferred to work with authoritarian state structures 
in the Middle East.251  Thus, the superpower and 1.4 billion 
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Muslims stand locked in mutual suspicion, distrust, and anger.252  
State structures in the Muslim world have been at best 
unresponsive and incompetent when it comes to meeting public 
need.253  In large part, the absence of public accountability and 
deeply-rooted bureaucratic traditions of self-governance have 
supported those state structures that result in corruption, patronage, 
and clientelism.254 
 Although the United States continues to be a superpower, it 
lacks the economic, political, and military capabilities to impose 
rules and effect conflict resolution on a global scale.255  As such, 
the United States supported authoritarian regimes that protected 
United States interests from hostile forces, preferring political 
stability over parliamentary democracy.256  As a result, the United 
States suffers from a credibility gap in convincing regional 
populations that it is serious about reform and democratization.257  
The United States has supported democratization as long as there 
was no clash with United States interests.258  Turkey is a prime 
example, because it was a strong United States ally which 
administrations praised as a model for Muslim majority societies, 
until Turkey began to shift its foreign policy toward the Israel-
Palestine conflict.259  In reality, citizens, including Arab-speaking 
citizens and democratic leaders, are more likely to be reliable allies 
in the long run than autocrats.260 
The United States credibility gap is the culmination of the 
United States frequently pulling back at the realization of what 
reordering might mean to its short-term interests.261  For instance, 
the United States considered the democratization in Palestine until 
Palestinians voted for Hamas, where Hamas was considered likely 
to counter United States’ short-term interests.262  Another dilemma 
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is that the United States has duality in its policy and requests help 
from the same regimes it hopes to change—including 
organizations such as al-Qaeda.263  The September 11, 2001 
attacks forced the United States to re-examine its policy towards 
the Muslim world and the Arab-speaking Middle East.264  In 
addition, lobby groups with their own agendas, such as the United 
States-based Jewish groups in support of Israeli nationalism, 
further complicate United States interests.265 
On the other hand, Russia has provided financial and 
military support to regimes not aligned with the United States, 
particularly the Assad regime; China has also supported Assad’s 
regime at least politically through Security Council vetoes.266  
Syria, as a Central Middle Eastern state, has, thus, received support 
from both Russia and China, where both have opposed intervention 
in the Syrian conflict, considering states as masters of their own 
internal affairs.267  Russia and China blocked a U.N. Security 
Council resolution against Syria’s government and its use of lethal 
force against protesters.268  China’s interests in the Middle East 
have been incompatible with American interests, trading with and 
providing technology and weapons to Syria and Iran.269   
As for the European Union, the close proximity of Middle 
Eastern countries to Europe generally makes the region an 
important economic and political player with the European 
Union.270  Europe also has immigration issues stemming from 
Middle Eastern states.  Thus, the European Union (“E.U.”) must 
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also grapple with the region, the region’s economic development, 
and the region’s stability.  The E.U. has various trade agreements 
with Central Middle Eastern states, particularly Israel.271  The E.U. 
has also attempted to broker peace in the Central Middle East on 
various occasions.272 The Oslo Accords are a prime example.273 
Thus, each of the global powers have interests in the region 
and in the Central Middle East in particular.  The United States has 
had complicated interests throughout the region.274  Russia and 
China have attempted to counter those interests to maintain their 
influence globally and regionally.275  Europe has had to deal with 
the political instabilities directly and indirectly through terrorism, 
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immigration, and economics.276  These interests conflict because, 
for example, the United States’ interests and interventions have not 
lead to stability, and have in turn contributed to terrorism in and 
immigration into Europe. 
These interests of the global powers are connected and 
intertwined with the regional interests and with the internal 
interests.  The United States has ties with Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia, while Russia and China have ties with Iran.277  The United 
States has also supported Saudi and Qatar’s indirect intervention in 
the Syrian conflict, providing weapons and money, while Russia 
provided the same to Syria’s regime.278  Thus, the internal interests 
of each groups and Central Middle Eastern states have connections 
to regional powers and global powers.  Such a scheme is not 
conducive to stability, but rather places groups and states at each of 
the three levels at odds. 
E. Results of the Intersection of Interests 
Al-Qaida, ISIS/IS, and other such groups cannot be allowed 
to grow.  It is arguably in the world's best interest to achieve more 
stability, particularly in the Central Middle East, because of the 
multi-leveled interests.  Unfortunately, global and regional powers 
have not been able to reach common grounds.  For example, the 
United States has stated their interests are maintaining some 
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oppression through autocratic regimes,279 with a sentiment among 
Middle Eastern populations that the United States is opposed 
political or economic progress in the region280.  As a result, the 
superpowers and the 1.4 billion Muslims continue to be locked in 
“mutual suspicion, distrust, and anger.” 281  There are analyses on 
the fears of allowing democracy in the Middle East, pointing 
democratic forces opposing the interests of global-powers.282  
These fears may be well founded; they should not, however, 
translate to complete disregard of stability, peace, and progress. 
 It would be in all parties’ interest to enforce stability and 
peace in the Central Middle East.   Peace would have to be 'neutral' 
in its form, such that it serves the interests of the local populations 
and individual states, including Iran, Turkey, the United States, the 
European states, Russia, and so on.  One source of interest that is 
not present, or known of, in the Central Middle East is oil.  
Researchers have not tapped into any major oil reserves in any part 
of these countries.  Thus, stability in these countries would not 
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come at the expense of oil-consuming countries.  Rather, stability 
in this area is likely to lead to better access to oil reserves in the 
surrounding countries and even eventual higher production of 
alternative energy sources including solar and wind. 
 The United States, European Union, and Russia, are all 
allowing the conflict to continue.  The United States arguably, 
through its foreign policy and stance towards Israel, the European 
Union, through its economic ties with Israel, but inability to 
contribute to economic growth in the other 4 states, and Russia, 
with its counter-interests to those of the United States and with its 
stance with Syria.   
The United States supports Israel, while other states 
encourage Israel to adjust its approach to Palestinian rights.283  
Palestinians have a cause for which to fight, and for Arab states 
and Islamic populations in general to believe in, when Palestinian 
rights are ignored.  Arab states, such as Syria, have used this cause 
                                                            
283 Situation in Palestine, supra note 60, ¶ 33 (discussing Israel is 
clearly violating Palestinians' right to self-determination and the right to 
determine how to implement self-determination and the right to permanent 
sovereignty); U.N., Comm. on Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 9 of the 
Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16 (2012) (noting 
Israel's planning and zoning policy in East Jerusalem, as well as in other parts of 
the West Bank, breaches Palestinian's fundamental rights); U.N., Comm. on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
State Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention,  ¶  10 U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.27 (1998) (expressing concern that the Arabic language is not 
given equal importance in practice); U.N., Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding Observations on the Second to Fourth Periodic Reports of Israel, 
Adopted by the Committee at its Sixty-Third Session (27 May – 14 June 2013), 
¶ 29(a), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4 (2013) (expressing concern that Israel's 
policy not to process residency applications and arbitrarily revoke residency of 
children in East Jerusalem have resulted in thousands of unregistered Palestinian 
children excluded from access to education); G.A. Res. 58/97 (Dec. 17, 2003); 
G.A. Res. 56/60 (Dec. 10, 2001); S.C. Res. 904 (Mar. 18, 1994) (reaffirming the 
Convention is applicable to Palestinian territories occupied by Israel, including 
Jerusalem); S.C. Res. 641(Aug. 30, 1989); Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
2004 I.C.J. Rep. 131, ¶¶ 115, 118 (July 9) (noting de facto annexation of land 
interferes with Palestinian people's right to self-determination, and Israeli 
recognition of the Palestinian people includes the right to self-determination). 
59
352 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 31:2 
to build its military for years; the same is true for Iran.  
Meanwhile, Russia continues to have interests in countering 
western pervasiveness and in maintaining an ally in each of Syria 
and Iran.  The goal of these opposing approaches is to serve and 
propagate each interest, rather than build a long-term vision for 
stability.  Thus, the self-serving focus is perpetuating conflict, 
instability, violations of human rights, terrorism, mass 
immigrations, local and proxy wars, and increasing risks of major 
regional and global conflicts. 
IV. FEDERALISM 
A fundamental issue in federalism is balancing central 
authority and state autonomy.284  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language (1969) describes federalism as 
“a form of government in which a union of states recognizes the 
sovereignty of a central authority while retaining certain residual 
powers of government.”285  In American federalism, the residual 
powers that states retain yields to a national standard in a given 
area of law when the national standard forms a federal scheme that 
is sufficiently comprehensive to occupy that area of law.286  As 
such, American federalism has arguably succeeded in providing a 
degree of regulatory variations across jurisdictions in regards to 
overarching principles and direction.287  This occurs while member 
states through Congress, and citizens through elections, have 
maintained a form of political check on the power of the central 
government.288 
 The Central Middle East legal structure requires 
coexistence, and the ability to address internal and external 
conflicting interests, in order to achieve stability.  For instance, an 
agreed-upon central authority in theory would have the incentive to 
build cohesiveness between the member states and coexistence of 
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their populations, as opposed to supporting separate internal 
interests and continued inter-state conflict.  A central authority 
would also have the incentive to promote trade and economic 
growth among the member states, from which all five potential 
states would greatly benefit. 
In regard to regional stability, the current political structure 
has shown that it promotes conflict and armed competition 
between the five neighboring states and their populations, rather 
than cooperation and genuine attempts to coexist.  This is evident, 
as described in the prior sections, primarily because the current 
structure does not serve the interests of each of the five states.  
This allows the conflicts to continue and increase, and in turn leads 
to competing regional and global interests that the five states 
cannot handle.  On the other hand, creating a legal foundation that 
acts as an umbrella and a binding fabric is likely to also create a 
primary and common interest among the five states that overrides 
and undermines conflicting interests, while also promoting 
negotiating power with regional and global interests.   
The benefits of a federal system lie in its promotion of 
unity and cooperation.  For instance, these five states and their 
populations would be better served by a common recognition 
similar to the United States’ privileges and immunities, such that 
an Israeli citizen visiting Syria would have the same protections in 
Syria as a Syrian citizen.  In addition, internal security interests 
would also be better served because there would be one army 
structure consisting of forces from all five states, protecting and 
upholding the primary common interest of the five states, as 
opposed to depleting resources on multiple competing armies to 
ensure security.  As for the global community, the United States 
would not have to balance its interests between Arab-speaking 
populations and the Jewish population because, theoretically, the 
five states would have one foreign policy that foremost serves the 
union.  Similarly, Russia and China and, the European Union 
would have less resistance particularly in regard to economic 
relations, thus also serving its economic interests. 
Naturally these are speculations, and, as the European 
experience has shown, such an attempt is not without challenges.  
Nonetheless, it is clear from history, from extreme and perpetual 
security and political conflicts, that the current political structure is 
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not conducive to co-existence.  Uniting these five states under one 
legal umbrella would directly address the reasons behind the 
conflicts. 
A. Proposed Structure  
As an example supporting federalism, the United States 
Constitution mandates that federal law preempts inconsistent state 
law, with the Constitution being the highest law of the different 
tiers of federal law.289  The European Union, as another example, 
has a draft of a European Constitution, which incidentally and 
unlike the United States, permits state withdrawal.290  Unlike the 
EU, however, a union between these Central Middle Eastern states 
would require stronger political unity that includes one military 
and one foreign policy.  Having one military is crucial to building 
trust and indiscriminate security between these states and their 
peoples. Additionally, having one military will also support and 
promote economic development and growth. 
As such, federalism, spearheaded by a federal constitution, 
is “a tool for political integration in pluralistic societies,” and a 
counter to majoritarian tyranny.291  Similar to Central Middle 
Eastern states and societies, Professor Chibli Mallat of Saint 
Joseph University in Beirut, Lebanon, points to Iraqi society and 
argues that federalism is the one model that can offer respite for 
Iraq’s communities to flourish.  Professor Mallat points to Iraq’s 
multiple dimensions of disunity—between Arabs and Kurds, and 
Sunnis and Shiites, and notes that a federal Iraq must be thought 
through the diversity and complexity of Iraq’s society.292  
Federalism arguably corrects the model of unitary nation-state by 
establishing an objective structure for social and political 
organization, while the unitary nation-states have proven to 
alienate either their minority populations (Israel) or their majority 
                                                            
289 Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1479, 1480 (2006). 
290Andrew C. Snavely, Should We Leave the Backdoor Open? Does an 
Agreement Uniting States Need a Withdrawal Provision: The European Union 
Draft Constitution, 73 UMKC L. REV. 213, 213–14 (2004).  
291 el-Gaili, supra note 138, at 514. 
292 Chibli Mallat, Federalism in the Middle East and Europe, 35 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 11–12 (2003). 
62https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/1
2019] CENTRAL MIDDLE EASTERN STATES 355 
populations not in power (Syria) and lead to conflicts of ethnic 
identities.293  Thus, broadly speaking, one strength of federalism is 
that it offers greater opportunities for power-sharing, and reduces 
the prospects of conflict by facilitating political participation.294 
 Another issue is the confusing, and arguably contentious, 
definition of statehood.  The international system defines a state as 
one with geographical boundaries, laws, recognition by other 
states, and a population.  While each of these has the potential to 
be contentious, it is the population aspect of the definition that is 
most relevant to the argument at hand.  That is, what group of 
persons would constitute a population in the Middle East?  For 
instance, do those of the Jewish faith constitute a population, or 
those who have lived within a given state boundaries for a 
prolonged period regardless of religious practice and regardless of 
lineage?  Are the Kurds in Northeast Syria members of the Syrian 
people, or must they continue to retain the 40-year refugee status?  
How about the Armenians throughout the Central Middle East? 
 There is no indication that international customary law 
limits ‘population’ by any definitions, such that there is no 
relationship to ethnic or religious boundaries; however, we often 
see that either those who come into power associate the state 
definition to ethnicity or religion, or that a given sect in the 
population perpetuates the association. 
 The multitude of peoples in the Middle East, of differing 
religious practices, lineages, and origins, each tend to desire a 
stake in governing the region.  If Israel were not around, no doubt 
the majority Muslim population would lean toward calling 
Palestine a Muslim or Arabic State. After all, the majority of the 
population practice Islam and speak Arabic.  Certainly, the Arabic 
speaking countries, most obvious examples being Qatar's and 
Saudi's recent agendas, have attempted to establish the Arabic state 
or some form of an Arabic union.   
The definition of statehood is at the core of the issue and 
today's struggles.  In the Central Middle Eastern reality, a state 
cannot abide or be limited by such limitations; rather, it must 
uphold the interests of all those residing under its jurisdiction, as 
                                                            
293 See el-Gaili, supra note 138, at 514. 
294 Id.  
63
356 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 31:2 
one people.  Thus, in the context of statehood, and political 
interests, all those residing under the state's jurisdiction must be 
considered as one people, and must not attach a characteristic of a 
given group of persons to the state itself. 
B. Political Interests 
Within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
history proves that both sides are unwilling to consider their issues 
of coexistence and both sides are ambivalent toward legal norms 
that can affect solutions.295  This conflict affects their political 
stability as well as the political stability of Syria, Jordan, and 
Lebanon.  As discussed above, the conflict and the 
uncompromising position on key points also draw sided support 
from regional and global powers. 
Similarly, in Syria and Lebanon, each has had its internal 
interests as well as conflicts with their neighbors, where no 
agreement thus far has achieved continued peace.   The 
agreements, as with the Taif Agreement,296 have arguably 
attempted to set rules for continued conflict, and not necessarily to 
resolve the conflicts.  While peace treaties between Israel and 
Jordan have actually achieved some recognition, it remains to their 
detriment that the lack of economic cooperation continues to reign 
between the two neighbors. 
To promote internal and inter-state security, political 
stability, economic cooperation, and economic growth, there needs 
to be at least some ties between the five states to highlight and 
perpetuate common interests among these states.  Federalism is the 
one political structure that can create the foundation for building 
such ties and for allowing the five states to advance their common 
interests.  Regional and global powers have shown they are not the 
proper parties to promote these ties because their vision is 
generally promoted by their own interests, in turn perpetuating the 
conflicting interests and consistently causing a disservice to the 
region and the global community. 
 The five states are more likely to cooperate with each other, 
in particular in regard to security and political stability, when they 
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are bound to each other and when their interests are tied.  A federal 
legal structure would act as that binding fabric, such that 
cooperation would outweigh inter-state conflicts and competing 
narrow internal interests. 
 While a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine is 
unclear and may still be moving forward with Palestine unilaterally 
and gradually moving to achieve full statehood, conflict and 
violence are likely to continue because such a structure does not 
serve the interests of either Israel or Palestine.  Israel seeks control, 
recognition, and security, while Palestine seeks political and 
economic independence.  With a Palestinian state, Israel loses 
control, and arguably access, over the West Bank, and East 
Jerusalem.  These territories would likely continue to be a 
contentious subject and a cause for violence from both sides.  As 
for the 150 or so settlements in the West Bank, removing them is 
one possibility, but even then, violence is more likely to persist 
from both sides, from Israelis unwilling to give up the land, and 
from Palestinians in retaliation. 
 On the other hand, federalism along with the other three 
Arabic-speaking states would better serve the interests of both 
Israelis and Palestinians.  While federalism would remove Israeli 
control over the occupied territories, the new access to these lands 
would likely mitigate this interest.  Israelis would also be able to 
live in those areas, albeit under Palestinian laws, but still under the 
protection of federal laws.  Such a status is more likely to serve 
both sides than the current status.  On the one hand, Palestinians 
would have these areas under self-control and self-determination, 
including control over natural resources and economic growth.  
Palestinians would also be able to provide Israelis with access to 
the West Bank, the option to remain in the West Bank, and 
protection from a united force that includes Israelis and 
Palestinians. 
 By the same token, federalism would also abate the conflict 
between Israel and Syria because Israel would be assured security 
from Syria, and access to the Golan Heights, while Syria would 
retain the Golan Heights and discontinue its war-stance against 
Israel.  This also serves both Lebanon and Jordan simply through 
political stability in and among their neighbors.   
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 There are those who would argue this is an impossibility, 
and nothing more than a formula for exacerbating the violence; 
however, it is the one method that can best serve or mitigate the 
interests of all sides.  Alternative methods, such as agreements, or 
even attempts at peace talks and agreements, do not succeed or 
often do not even reach a signatory step because the ultimate goals 
of such talks cannot adequately serve any given party’s interests.297  
For instance, talks between Syria and Israel have never reached a 
milestone, most likely because of the positions regarding the Golan 
Heights, and Lebanon continues to have internal conflicts while its 
Hezbollah continues its strife with Israel. 
Therefore, a federal structure between the five states would 
serve the internal and inter-state political interests among these 
five states, while also providing a platform to handle external 
interests.  Federalism arguably is more likely to provide the 
foundation for stability and security than any agreement or attempt 
thus far, because its aim would be to directly address each interest 
that is giving rise to the conflicts. 
C. Economic Interests 
Federalism among the five states is also the necessary 
foundation for economic growth in all five states.  Generally, the 
issue of establishing a regional order in the larger Middle East is 
fundamental to addressing the conflicts in the region.298  Regional 
economics contribute to building order, or causing chaos in the 
face of stagnant conditions.  For instance, the peace and relative 
economic prosperity in Western Europe may be traced to European 
countries eliminating trade barriers in certain sectors, which in turn 
generated a degree of interdependence and order.299  Halabi, in 
1997, argued that economic interdependence between countries in 
the Middle East is the most effective means of maintaining peace 
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and breaking the cycle of instability.300  Halabi cited Lubetzky, 
arguing that economic cooperation would dampen animosities and 
encourage coexistence and that nations at war without economic 
relations have few shared interests to push them toward peace.301  
The issue, then, is effecting such economic cooperation.   
Thus far, the region in general has been trapped in a cycle 
of “low growth, bad . . .  governance, and resistance to economic 
globalization.”302  The reason for such a cycle is arguably the lack 
of a supporting legal structure.  Economic policies require a legal 
foundation, whether through internal policies or through inter-state 
trade structures.  Thus, while the mechanics of integration may rely 
on economic policies, and free trade may help with solving the 
region’s issues, political will is the driving force and the necessary 
foundation and catalyst because it is political will that would create 
the necessary legal structure to allow, support, and enforce the 
mechanics of integration and economic policies.303    
Government is necessary to provide the legal framework 
for entrepreneurship.304  Some common characteristics of 
successful economies include income equality, government 
policies, political and economic freedoms, political stability, and 
good governance.305   
Halabi wrote that the obvious partner “to aid in 
encouraging economic development and mutual economic 
interdependence [in the Middle East] is the United States.”306  
Unfortunately, discourse and agendas for democracy and free 
market initiatives in the 1990s between the United States Agency 
for International Development and non-governmental 
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organizations did not extend to the Middle East.307  In addition, 
local sectarianism continues to hinder productive economic 
relationships. 
Sectarianism, possibly summarizing the entire conflict in 
general, blocks productive legal discourse and free market 
initiatives.  Cultural stereotypes, collective representations of 
ancient blood-feuds, and religious conundrums help prevent legal 
investigations and judicial intervention.308  To dismantle 
sectarianism, the political and economic realities must be attended 
to.309   
A given state looking to promote growth must sacrifice 
powers and reduce state and business interaction, thus allowing 
business to thrive,310 while working to enforce overarching 
principles.  Principles, such as individuals’ rights and needs, 
cannot continue to be secondary to communal needs; for instance, 
the Jewish community’s rights and needs in Israel must be adhered 
to while also not taking precedence over rights of non-Jews.311  
Thus, building, deployment, application, and affirmation of law, 
are crucial to resolving the problems of today’s Middle East.312 
To be able to address the intersection of the numerous 
interests, the five current states must fall under one legal umbrella, 
one ‘federal’ constitutional foundation, while also affecting 
equality, non-discrimination, and autonomy within the boundaries 
of the larger federal legal umbrella and principles.  Such a legal 
umbrella is the one method to support and promote economic 
cooperation and growth among the five states.   
 The European experience and experiment provides a useful 
comparison.  The European powers and community likely 
envisioned the European Union as a method to administer justice 
and to regulate the internal market,313 as well as to create more 
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leverage globally.  However, Europe’s objectives appear to be 
unclear, such that there appears to be only a general approach: 
“more Europe” along with a goal of avoiding nationalism and a 
promise of no superstate but without regard to whether common 
policies create public bads and lead to wasteful public spending.314  
Part of the issue may be that Europe needs to be a political union 
when it is widely unclear what a political union is.315  One theory 
is that a political union means linking the stabilization of financial 
markets and public finances with Europeans—that is, with the 
people—but without a dependency on the consent of national 
governments.316  Another theory identifies a political union as one 
having an integrated foreign policy, common defense, and 
organized military, all of which the EU lacks.317   
It is arguable that for the EU to succeed, Europeans, as 
citizens of the EU, would have to recognize the benefits of 
integration and accept that such benefits come with obligations, 
including, for example, integration of a tax system.318  A similar 
argument can be made for the Middle East; the difference, 
however, is that arguably it is the Middle Eastern governments that 
must reach such a recognition and admission.   
Thus, the governments of the five states need to reach 
consensus and recognition of their connected interests and the 
benefits of creating political ties.  Their economic interests are best 
served by creating and building these political ties, which in turn 
serves the interests of their populations and, at least in part, address 
a cause of instability, insecurity, and terrorism. 
D. Accountability to One Another 
The five states must also become accountable to each other 
first and foremost, before they are accountable to the international 
community.  This is especially true for discrimination, travel, and 
security.  Simply put, the five states, the state governments, and the 
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proposed federal government, must become accountable to each 
other and to their citizens—to the entire populous. 
The United States sets a useful example, given that it is 
arguably the only successful federal system with the large scale of 
its population, land size, and ethnic diversity of its population.319  
In the United States, laws are made through a comparatively 
balanced process designed to be difficult, such that the actors in the 
process are accountable to each other and to the people.320  The 
United States structure achieves relative accountability through 
substantive restrictions imposed by its Constitution, and procedural 
restrictions imposed by the structural branches of both Houses of 
Congress and the President.321  Substantive restrictions include 
state protections and individual rights; while procedural rules may 
apply to creating laws as well as enforcing them.322  Meanwhile, 
the nation’s judicial branch, through the nation’s highest court, 
plays a role in defining Congress’ substantive limits and has played 
an even more prominent role in limiting Congress’ enforcement 
powers.323  In comparison, the EU has not fared as well in regards 
to accountability, as its Council’s decisions are made away from 
the public eye, and the check on intergovernmental authority is 
lacking.324  
Certainly, Central Middle Eastern states have unique 
issues, many of which are dissimilar from the United States and the 
European challenges; nonetheless, the broad lessons of 
accountability between one state government to one another, to 
their respective peoples, and to the people in the area as a whole, 
all apply.  The United States structure provides ample lessons in 
the usefulness of accountability, checks and balances, and 
separation of powers.  Arguably, the European experience provides 
as much from which to learn. 
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Moreover, because it is the governments who have failed to 
reach the necessary agreements to achieve political stability, these 
same governments cannot have access to military power of mass 
destruction.  In other words, unlike with the EU, the Central 
Middle East requires one army, such that the five states would act 
in unison in regard to threats, and would not have opportunities to 
threaten one another. That army, however, must attain only limited 
strength just enough to handle internal non-state forces and threats, 
and maintain regional deterrence from opposing outside interests, 
until at least a reasonable measure of political and economic 
stability is achieved.  Such a limitation would likely limit 
aggression and would likely allow for more adherence to human 
rights; for example, the limitation would include a ban against 
weapons of mass destruction.  Additionally, security against 
regional intrusion or influence can come through leverage and 
international agreements. 
Therefore, accountability through the legal structure is 
necessary to promote stability and to sustain the political and legal 
union.  Such accountability must address property rights, 
discriminatory practices, and disrespect of human life and 
violations of humanitarian law, as well as issues of larger scale 
such as a unified taxing system and military. 
E. Risks 
Risks are plenty with virtually any venture.  In the case of 
these five Middle Eastern states, there may be risks of one 
particular state obtaining excessive control.  Another is that of one 
ethnic and religious majority leading to an imbalance in the 
political structure.  Yet another is the risk attached to centralization 
and the creation of a superstate.  It remains, however, that the risks 
attached to creating a federal structure for the Central Middle East 
are simply and clearly exponentially smaller than the risks and 
issues attached to the current political structure. 
A possible risk that the federal structure would have to 
consider is one state acting more aggressively than the other states 
to achieve its agenda and to meet its interests.  Israel, for example 
has historically taken such a stance, arguably to sustain its 
existence.  Such a stance, however, is likely to be a danger to 
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achieving reasonable balance of political cohesion within a federal 
structure. 
As an example of Israel’s stance, consider Prime Minister 
(P.M.) Netanyahu’s position on the Goldstone report of 2009.325  
Prime Minister Netanyahu called the report biased and unjust and 
asked the international community, “Will you stand with Israel or 
will you stand with the terrorists? We must know the answer to 
that question now.  Only if we have the confidence that we can 
defend ourselves can we take further risks for peace.”326  P.M. 
Netanyahu's comment further signals Israel's stance, 'with us or 
with terrorists?'  proclaiming that there are only two sides, and that 
P.M. Netanyahu’s perspective is the natural choice.  Such an 
approach cannot coincide with a federal structure.  In other words, 
there would need to be a commitment to the revised political 
structure, to federalism, for federalism to survive.  The lack of 
commitment to federalism for its own sake have contributed to 
failures of federal experiments elsewhere, such as with African 
countries where federalism was perceived as a step toward 
unification.327 
 There is also the danger of the international federal system 
reducing the nation state to the format that market liberals find 
desirable, at the expense of the rights of individuals.328  There is 
the argument, for example, that an internationally-designed federal 
system eliminates government bailouts for ailing industries 
because there would not be sufficient popular support for aiding 
one industry in a given region over another in a different region, 
thus hampering social programs at the state level because of 
widespread regulatory competition.329  On the opposite end is the 
European experience, where there is an extensive effort to avoid 
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the superstate and nationalism by strengthening the economic and 
monetary union while democracy becomes a secondary goal.330  
 It is natural to have risks.  However, risks can be managed 
by acknowledging them and building structures to address them.  
On the other hand, the current political lines in the Central Middle 
East have proven to be irreconcilable with the interests of the 
area’s populations, and continue to lead to violent conflicts, 
regionally and globally.  Thus, when the risks of exploring and 
building a structure that addresses the root of the instabilities are 
compared to the current ills caused by contemporary political lines, 
these risks are minute in comparison.  Risks attached to a possible 
solution to an existing issue cannot be the reason for avoiding that 
solution.  Each of the risks considered above, as well as others that 
are not mentioned, can be addressed. While some issues, such as 
continued terrorism and radicalism, have become too pervasive 
such that they are no longer just risks, these are social threats that 
should not be tolerated.  Allowing the current political lines to 
continue is effectively allowing these threats to continue and grow.  
Thus, the true risk is not in a federal structure as an attempt to 
resolve the issues in the Middle East, but rather it is in allowing the 
root reasons for the existing threats to continue. 
 It is in the best interest of all parties, internal, regional, and 
global, that the Central Middle Eastern states have a vision and a 
plan to establish stability.  Federalism is arguably the best 
approach because it has the potential to meet the primary internal 
interests, the interests of warring groups, as well as those of each 
state as a whole.  In turn, stability in these states can also serve the 
interests of regional and global powers because of the potential for 
growth in economic cooperation without necessarily relinquishing 
alliances.  Thus, federalism is the one solution that can serve the 
wide range of the conflicting interests, while also addressing the 
current threats of radicalism and growing instability. 
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED 
Military alliances, such as the alliance between Syria and 
Iran, and the former alliance between Turkey and Israel, 
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contributed to further instability.331  In addition, Israeli and 
Palestinian failure to implement the Oslo accords blocked efforts 
to reorder and stabilize the Middle East.332  As discussed above, 
arguably the Oslo accords were doomed to fail because the terms 
did not meet the interests of either Israel or Palestine.  Other 
agreements such as that between Israel and Lebanon in 1997 to 
address their conflict, only served to allow Lebanon’s two 
neighbors, Israel and Syria, to compete, for or against, Lebanon’s 
interests and politics.333  Another alternative is the involvement of 
regional powers like Turkey and Saudi Arabia.  The media 
reported in mid 2015 about Turkey and Saudi Arabia forming a 
pact to help Syrian rebels fight Syria’s regime, possibly as part of a 
proxy war against Iran.334  Two weeks prior to this announcement, 
the Syrian ambassador to the United Nations accused the Saudis of 
“cultivating a culture of sectarian bloodshed[.]”335   
Such a pact likely promotes and perpetuates sectarianism, 
exponentially grows divisions among the local groups, and leads to 
increased instability, as opposed to Turkey’s and Saudi’s guise of 
seeking stability.  Unfortunately, these interests will not serve the 
region or the global community.  For instance, with Syria being 
Russia’s final true ally in the area, and with Russia and China 
likely to side with Iran, Turkey’s and Saudi’s pact is more likely to 
further divide the global community into two sides: the United 
States, the European Union, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf states on 
one side, and Russia, China, and Iran on the other.  In short, 
Turkey and Saudi’s pact is an example of regional interests 
interfering with local as well as global stability and not as an 
attempt with the smallest likelihood of achieving stability. 
Tibi points to three competing alternatives for establishing 
order in the Middle East: (1) The US-Israeli concept of a new 
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Middle East that emerged from the Oslo accords; (2) an exclusive 
Arab system that gives control to Middle Eastern powers; and (3) 
the Euro-Mediterranean community, tying the Middle East and 
Europe.336  Each of these alternatives serves one side while 
ignoring another.  The first alternative favors Israel; while the 
second favors Arabic-speaking or Muslim states.  The third 
alternative supports growth in all the Central Middle Eastern states, 
but has not succeeded in addressing Syria’s interests or bringing 
Syria into the Middle Eastern market, and has not succeeded in 
addressing Jordan’s nor Lebanon’s challenges. 
Other methods, such as alternative dispute resolutions, 
enable parties to a conflict to evade analyses of, and interventions 
in, institutionalized injustices and structural violence.  In turn, such 
avoidance enables those committing the injustices to continue 
enjoying impunity and to legitimize a social structure that favors 
the powerful.337  Irani notes that political agreements such as Oslo 
displaced international law in practice, and as result rendered 
humanitarian law and human rights as negotiable.338 
A two-nation state attempt for Israel and Palestine at the 
minimum is likely to be harsh on minorities in either nation 
state;339 it may also to lead to majoritarian tyranny.  It is better to 
use territorial and communitarian federalism to allow the law to 
regulate between the various communities as opposed to building 
separate nations.340  Majoritarian tyranny can be defined as any 
violation of the natural or the positive rights of minorities, as 
stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”), the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights or domestic constitutions.341  Such tyranny is likely to arise 
when the majority is self-interested or hostile to minority 
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concerns,342 such as with the Muslim Palestinian population in 
Palestine. 
In regard to trade and economics, existing agreements with 
integration efforts between Arab states in general have been 
ineffective likely due to administrative challenges and insufficient 
political commitments.343  Thus, actual and meaningful political 
commitments, and legal administrative structures, specifically 
among the five states, are necessary to achieve stability, as well as 
economic relationships and growth. 
 
VI. BROAD PICTURE OF THE PROPOSED LEGAL STRUCTURE AND 
METHOD OF IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Federal Structure and a Constitution 
Analyzing a society in the context of federalism enlists a 
tripartite analysis: that of culture (ideologies), politics (legal), and 
economics.344  On the other hand, from a constitutional 
perspective, the basic staples of federalism include freedom of 
movement for people, freedom of capital, and full faith and credit 
clauses.345  More specifically, the political ideas of the American 
system can be categorized into six groups: 1) representative 
republicanism, 2) federalism, 3) separation of powers, 4) equality 
before the law, 5) individual autonomy, and 6) procedural 
fairness.346 
As an example, the American system provides two 
inventions—federalism and the Supreme Court.347  As for the 
European Union, it is arguable that it is, in fact, progressing in a 
direction similar to that of the United States, certainly through its 
Court of Justice as a parallel to the United States Supreme Court.  
For instance, a unifying dimension to Europe is now the Court of 
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Justice decision in Costa, making communitarian law prevalent 
over any national law.348  Costa said that the European treaty 
established a judicial order that is integrated into the legal systems 
of member states, and imposes itself on their jurisdictions.349  The 
effect is that a law passed in a member state will not stand before a 
law passed at the level of the European Union, even if the latter is 
in the form of a lower level lawmaking tool—such as a 
directive.350  
In the Middle East, not a single experiment of unity has 
succeeded beyond the existing nation states, along the boundaries 
that the colonial powers formed.  Taken a step further, it is the 
reality of secession that is, in fact, more prevalent.351  On the other 
hand, ideas of federalism, and in turn, inter-state cooperation and 
unity, remain absent.  One explanation that has been presented is 
that legal education in the Middle East never carried the 
construction of federalism because Middle Eastern legal education 
has been entrenched with British and French models, neither of 
which has had any experience with federalism.352  Noting that 
federalism is an invention, Mallat argues that all unity experiments 
in the Middle East have failed because of the legal education’s 
failure to introduce federalism as a possible legal structure.353   
Part of the risk in federalism; however, is that bringing 
democracy to the Middle East, as part of federalism, in the form of 
one person-one vote, may result in majority mistreatment of 
minorities.354  Moreover, states generally do not volunteer to 
protect human rights, and protection of minorities will be 
considered unpopular by the government as well as its majoritarian 
constituency.  Thus, protections must be institutionalized in a 
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constitution or through a variety of structural measures.355  For 
instance, the United States’ system includes protections in its 
Constitution – the Bill of Rights – and entrusts the courts to 
enforce these rights and constrain majorities through constitutional 
limits.356  Moreover, the administrative decentralization and 
reduced sovereignty of the union reduce the prospect of 
majoritarian tyranny.357 
The Central Middle East may, after all, require an invention 
of its own.  Nations that have practiced federalism have practiced 
“essentially . . . geographical” federalism, employing boundaries to 
project the voice of the people within those regions. 358  However, 
geographical federalism cannot accommodate all Middle Eastern 
countries because of divisions along personal and sectarian 
matters.359  An alternative form is communitarian federalism, one 
that is not based on geography but on the communities mixed 
within boundaries.360  At least two Middle Eastern countries are 
experimenting with communitarian federalism: Lebanon and 
Israel.361  The Lebanese model achieves some balance by 
dedicating the presidency to the Christian Maronite sect, the post 
of the Prime Minister to Sunni Muslims, and that of parliament 
speaker to Shiʿi Muslims.362  Israel has limited communitarian 
federalism through family law; Israel allows Muslims and 
Christians to have their own respective courts and allows those of 
the Jewish faith to marry according to religious tradition, while the 
state implements the courts’ decisions.363  However, Israel’s 
system excludes political decisions from federalism, since there 
appears to be little Arab representation at the decision-making 
level.364 
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Moreover, Israel’s security “can only be guaranteed when it 
makes peace with the people of the region” and when justice is 
given to Palestinians.365  Constitutional reform to allow freedom of 
speech and the formation of political parties, among others, should 
be part of the agenda,366 in all five states.  Thus, there needs to be a 
unique accommodation of “both geographical and communitarian 
federalism” to address the Middle Eastern society.367 
To reach such an arrangement, the five states must reach a 
constitution, and then they must respect the supremacy of the 
agreed upon and established constitutional values.  They can do so 
through, for instance, federal preemption, an independent 
judiciary, and the will to enforce these values and protections.368  
There also needs to be political integration of the various groups 
and interests, which in turn requires national institutions and a 
security system that are made up of members of all of these 
groups.369 
Finally, limiting policies such as the doctrine of emergency 
law must be considered as a last resort and only for the common 
good, with the condition that loss of certain freedoms is temporary 
and only to facilitate the return to normalcy and restoration of 
human rights.370  Thus, there must be a framework and 
enforcement where such policies cannot become permanent and 
cannot be implemented to serve the limited interest of one group. 
 B. Separation of Church and State and Protections of Human 
Rights 
Secularism is necessary for federalism’s success; 
federalism, as a structural remedy, is effective “only when a set of 
constitutional, institutional, and social conditions are present[,]” 
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including that of secularism.371  Most importantly, federalism 
cannot be a substitute for secularism.372   
International law, such as through the UDHR bars 
distinctions according to religion, among other distinctions and 
discriminations.373  To reference the American system, rights are 
vested with individuals, and not with religious groups.374  If the 
federal state were to provide support for certain religious groups, it 
must do the same for all religious groups present, ensuring that all 
religious are treated equally.375   
Introducing elements of a majority religion into the federal 
structure would frustrate the purpose of federalism, in large part 
because the structure would fail to prevent majoritarian 
oppression.376  The result would likely be discrimination against a 
differing religious group, and where non-believers become 
subjects, rather than citizens.377  Religion-based federalism also 
appeals to divine mandates that the de facto state religion 
proscribes, in turn extending divinity to human opinions of 
scholars and politicians.378  In addition, divine scripture inhibits 
any government to a rigid appeal and stunts the evolution of 
federal relations between the constituent states.379   
A federal structure in these five states must not integrate 
the values, or the rules, of one religion into its legal foundations 
and definitions.  Such integration, in spite of arguments for 
identity, would lead to discrimination as well as inequality, in turn 
creating the danger of oppression and then revolt.  Thus, at some 
point, the five states must recognize the benefits of separating 
religion from the state, as opposed to the dangers of integrating 
religion with the state. 
 Finally, the traditional Montevideo Convention criteria for 
statehood has expanded such that the fourth attribute of statehood, 
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the capacity to engage in international relations, arguably now 
includes a demonstrated respect for human and minority rights.380   
Today, any entity seeking statehood must demonstrate that it will 
respect human and minority rights.381  In other words, recognition 
of a given state, and its involvement in international trade, cannot 
be when that state actively chooses to ignore humanitarian laws 
and human rights.  We have collectively decided to recognize these 
principles.  Ignoring them and refusing to support them 
undermines the statehood structure in its entirety and hinders 
humanity’s development as a whole. 
 
C. Method of Implementation: Begin Internally 
 
A key internal conflict in the Central Middle East is public 
demand for citizenship rights and effective accountable 
governments.382  Thus, crucial to successful integration is defining 
transitional steps to full integration, and setting a credible timetable 
to recognizing rights and building accountable government.383   
Leaders of the current five states: (1) must commit to operating 
under a federal legal system;384 (2) must meet in a scheduled 
manner; (3) must create agreeable federal legal structures; and; (4) 
must create roadmaps for implementation.  Global powers must 
provide support, but must not influence and must not attempt to 
coerce these five to accept ideals and values of the Great Powers. 
In considering the trend toward regionalization in world 
politics, and the ‘“revolt against the West,”’ “any Western 
intervention in an Islamic country, even for humanitarian reasons, 
would lend support to Islamists’ conspiracy theories[.]”385  Also, 
Arabic-speaking rulers consider a desirable system as one of 
“multipolar international system that allows for regionalization of 
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world politics” as opposed to global order maintained by a 
superpower.386  
In addition, allowing the five states to design and develop a 
desired structure, with only support from global powers, is also 
likely to serve long-term interests of the global powers.  For 
instance, the 9/11 Commission Report noted that long-term 
setbacks for American interests often outweighed short-term gains 
from cooperating with repressive governments.387  Unfortunately, 
Hashemi notes, citing Tomara Coffman Wittes, that the United 
States preference for democratic politics in the Arab world has 
long been tempered by the belief that “victors of a democratic 
process are unlikely to share America’s policy preferences in the 
region.”388 
Powerful and influential states, such as the United States, 
Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and Germany, appear to 
directly dictate courses of action of less sovereign states.389  
In large part, a core issue is that local populations resent 
their incorporation into a western-defined world order, where this 
order has been based on European norms and values, and not 
chosen by the people of the Middle East.390  While a federal 
structure is a western concept, a constitution and legal structure 
developed, agreed upon, and implemented internally and between 
local leaders is more likely to be seen as a locally-invented and 
developed structure, and not as a western import.  Thus, the 
structure must be borne and designed from within to gain traction 
and local support. 
 
D. The Great Powers Must Provide Support, But Not Influence 
 
It is unrealistic to separate external interests in the region 
from the region, particularly those interests of influential and 
powerful states such as the United States, Russian, China, and the 
                                                            
386 Id. at 205. 
387 Hashemi, supra note 84, at 33. 
388 Id. at 35 (quoting TAMARA COFMAN WITTES, FREEDOM’S 
UNSTEADY MARCH: AMERICA’S ROLE IN BUILDING ARAB DEMOCRACY 21 
(2008)). 
389 See Sterio, supra note 380, at 220–21. 
390 Tibi, supra note 10, at 193. 
82https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/1
2019] CENTRAL MIDDLE EASTERN STATES 375 
United Kingdom.  For instance, as previously stated, Western allies 
have continuously supported authoritarian regimes because those 
regimes were generally more likely to serve western interests, and 
because new forces seemed to drift into revolutionary and anti-
western positions.391 
It remains that the United States may be able to effect 
change, but, as with the 2003 Iraq invasion, it is clear that it cannot 
control what follows.392  In 2006, Singer wrote that the United 
States must resolve: (1) how it will support change, while 
recognizing that it is unable to control which forces will benefit 
from that support, (2) how it will react to reform debate in the 
Muslim world without undermining debate; and (3) how it will 
respond to the demographic change that will reorder politics and 
societies.393   
Singer cites Middle East expert, professor Telhami, in 
noting that it is a delusion that American programs and efforts can 
help build a third alternative to both current governments and 
Islamists; rather, the United States must be flexible enough to open 
dialogues with the diverse set of actors in the region.394  This 
includes Russia as an influential power.  As such, global powers, in 
large part the United States and Russia, must support federalism as 
the long-term vision and meetings between the local leaders to 
affect a roadmap towards that vision.  Such support must happen 
without going so far as to influence the leaders, because any 
influence would most likely result in serving opposing external 
interests rather than universal interests. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the Central Middle East is home to 
numerous internal interests and conflicts, including ethnic and 
religious interests.  The region also attracts numerous regional and 
global interests.  The political and legal structure in this region 
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arguably pins the five states and their peoples against each other, 
such that the only possible result is continuous instability and 
insecurity, such as the war in Syria.  Moreover, such instability 
acts as an obstacle to economic growth, further fueling 
fundamentalism.  Past attempts at unions, such as those between 
Syria and Egypt, and Israel and Palestine, were short-lived and did 
not succeed.  Agreements and treaties, including the Oslo treaty 
between Israel and Palestine, have failed to affect peace and 
stability.  Federalism for the five states is a solution because it can 
address the core internal interests of each groups, while also 
leading each group to concede interests that inherently conflict 
with those of other groups. 
For example, federalism would lead to a separation 
between church and state and can afford all religious groups 
equality; on the other hand, agreement between the five states over 
legal structure and federal institutions would allow such equality 
credibility as well as enforceability.  In addition, federalism 
encourages economic growth, which in turn would act to abate 
factors that encourage fundamentalism.  Federalism would also 
strengthen the five states in such a manner as to become better able 
to address the conflicting global interests, while at the same time 
serving those global interests by being better positioned to 
contribute to the global community. 
In conclusion, it is clear and unarguable that the current 
political and legal structure in the Central Middle East has been an 
abysmal failure.  The constant instability and insecurity are clear 
indications of this failure.  The issue lies in the structure itself, as 
one not envisioned by the local populations, and as one that pins 
the local populations against each other.  Federalism, locally 
devised and globally supported, would allow these groups to 
address their interests and devise a legal structure that allows them 
to co-exist and to grow economically. 
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